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THE JOURNEY OF A SOCIAL MOVMENT: A GLIMPSE INTO
HIZB'ALLAH AND ITS INTEGRATION INTO THE
LEBANESE LANDSCAPE
Lisa L. Peters, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2005
Historically, research in Social Movement Theories has been limited to only
certain aspects of a social movement, whether it was the impetus of the movement,
explaining the reasons for its mobilization, how they recruit members and money,
how social movements are able to function as an organization, or why groups suffer
demise after flourishing for a period of time.

This research attempts to build a

framework of a particular social movement, Hizb'allah, a Shi'a Islamic movement
based in Lebanon. This framework is built by extracting various elements from
several social movement theories to explain and illustrate this movement's life course
including its origin, history, success, and its current organizational structure. This
method of borrowing various aspects from these models like pieces of a puzzle allows
us to design a pattern that can potentially build a model to generalize to various other
social movements. We can also see the patterns emerge as to why a social movement
may begin, how they develop and what, if any, determinants contribute to the demise
of a social movement. This method of building bridges between these theories also
helps to establish a general holistic theoretical explanation to the life course of a
social movement, which is something that this researcher has yet to find any current
theories do.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Throughout world history individuals have mobilized into groups to rise up
against greater powers to achieve economic and religious freedom, as well as political
power. Some of these groups have evolved into social movements, making strides in
achieving their goals and rewriting history, while some have disappeared as quickly
as they originated. Some eventually surpassed the expectations of their critics, as
well as their own expectations. What are the factors that determine success or failure
of these groups? Can these factors predict a movement's success?

By taking an in

depth look into one social movement, is it possible to predict the future success or
failure of other movements? Finally, how does a movement transform itself from
being the renegade to part of the status quo?

A Theoretical Glimpse
In general, what characteristics historically have been present, and absent, in
the development of a social movement? Is there a 'blueprint' for organizing a
successful movement? What circumstances have enabled these movements to rise
above others and enjoy longevity and legitimacy? Chapter 2 discusses these
questions through a literature review of fundamental characteristics drawn from
leading sociological theorists. Chapter 2 will also introduce Hizb'allah as the primary
case study for this thesis, applying the theoretical ideas through example.
A historical survey of Lebanon and Hizb'allah are the subjects for Chapters 3
and 4. To understand Hizb'allah and its role in Lebanon, these chapters will provide
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a basic overview of both these subjects. Also critical is the description of this history
and environment in which Hizb'allah emerged. This provides the reader with a
general knowledge base of the Middle East and conditions in post World War I
colonized Lebanon through the onset of the Lebanese Civil War.
Chapter 5 applies the theoretical criteria from Chapter 2 to Hizb'allah by
analyzing concrete examples of its development. By applying these theoretical
models to Hizb'allah, a clear picture will emerge as to how Hizb'allah was able,
either intentionally or unintentionally, to develop their movement into a greater
institution.
Chapter 6 continues to examine the transformation of Hizb'allah into a social
movement organization. Chapter 6 examines how Hizb'allah emerged using guerilla
warfare and evolved into a highly structured organization that has achieved immense
political success. Chapter 6 will also help to answer the question of why Hizb'allah
succeeded when so many other groups either remained at their same power position
or evaporated into the post-war environment. Hizb'allah's transformation has
certainly been one of the most infamous and dramatic in Lebanese history. Is this
type of transformation unique to Hizb'allah, or is it possible to follow a theoretical
recipe to gain success for future collective action groups? Could this type of group,
for instance, ever gain the level of legitimacy in the United States that it has in
Lebanon? Or did we have these types of movements in our own history? Were the
American revolutionaries in the fight for freedom from Britain in the 18th century
similar to those who fight with Hizb'allah and other movements throughout the
world?
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Relevance
There are several reasons why this topic is relevant. First, the contemporary
issues of the day, the 'war on terrorism', the war in Iraq, the fighting in Israel and the
overall unrest in the Middle East certainly make this particular topic an important
subject to understand. However, any of the above issues cannot be studied by only
looking at the 'Arab' side of these events. The roles played [and still played] by the
United States, England and France since the colonization of the region, the reactions
of these civilizations to being colonized, and the problems plaguing this region today
all are important issues that need to be critically deconstructed, not covered up by
simply calling the opposition 'terrorists'. Hizb'allah's label as a 'terrorist group'
certainly did not originate without merit, or support. Their anti-western mentality at
the genesis of their movement was not an isolated ideal, but a sentiment felt in large
communities throughout the region, and still felt today. A look into the rationale of
such a movement may possibly shed light on current issues surrounding disparities
between groups and the western world in this region today.
Another reason to study this topic is to understand how Hizb'allah recruits
members, how they maintain their momentum, and how they have developed into
structured institutions. By understanding their methods in recruitment and
organizational structure, perhaps we will be able to predict the success of future
movements' capacities to recruit and maintain members.
Finally, in a more abstract sense, this theoretical 'recipe' could illustrate how
groups convey their ideology, which at first appears radical, and channel their ideas
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into mainstream thought, gaining membership and allegiance. Why do people join
cults, bomb abortion clinics, or even sacrifice their own lives for the cause of their
movement? What draws people into these groups, and why do these groups appear
to be within the acceptable norms of society? How easy is it for a social movement to
create social conformity among its members?

Methodology
The primary sources for this thesis have been secondary data. Books, journal
articles, newspaper articles, government documents [both Lebanese and American],
and websites all contribute to this glimpse into Hizb'allah and social movement
theory. Also useful were various news reports on Future TV, LBC [Lebanese
Broadcasting Company], and Al-Jezeera Television.

Limitations o(Study
There are several limitations to this study that must be made known to the
reader. First, a language barrier exists for this researcher who does not speak fluent
Arabic, and cannot read Arabic at all.

Time constraints did not allow for possible

documentation to be translated for this thesis; however, in future research on this
topic, this researcher plans on pursuing this secondary data.
Another limitation was the inability to interview top leaders within Hizb'allah.
Hizb'allah is a very secretive group, so it is difficult for an outsider, especially a non
Arab outsider, to reach into the internal leadership of a movement such as Hizb'allah
and interview members unprejudiciously. Proper proposals for interviews to key
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members in Parliament who are Hizb' allah party members might allow for future
interviews to take place.

..

Finally, this is a case study of one group in one country. This case study was
a snapshot into one group at one period of time in one country. To be able to make
predictions regarding future movements or the creation of a movement, research
should be done on a more quantitative basis, looking at several movements and
depicting many different elements that are reflected consistently within these
movements.
This research is qualitative, a descriptive analysis and comparative look into
Hizb'allah and how it can be analyzed with the theoretical framework set out in the
theoretical model in Chapter 2. This research is a case study, but it is also intended to
take abstract sociological ideas on social movements and apply them to a real
movement, in hopes of creating a blueprint to help analyze other movements.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Models ofSocial Movements
Introduction
Social discontent is as old as history itself, and is the driving force behind
people pulling together for social change. The nature of society and impetus behind
social change has always been the elite vs. the oppressed and dissatisfaction with
society on some level or another, whether politically, economically, communally,
racially, or all of the above. How and why people choose to invoke change as a
collective body is as interesting a topic as the events themselves.
There are many ways in which social change is directed, and many
instruments used to precipitate social change. People look for ways of demonstrating
their dissatisfaction with the status quo in society, and in their discontent find other
people who very often feel the same way. When this dissatisfaction is felt, people
join together in various degrees of commitment and intensity.

Collective Action
Collective action takes on many forms from simple, unplanned crowd
demonstrations to intricate, multi-dimensional institutions. Social movements fall
into the latter category, but to what degree they become 'institutionalized', taking on
an organizational structure with a hierarchy of leadership and established roles
defined within these hierarchies, depends on many factors that will be discussed in
this chapter. According to Tilley's [1978] theory of collective action, there are
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critical elements that must be present for collective action to exist. The first element
is a common interest. There is an issue that these group members all agree needs to
be addressed. The second is that a group, in order to be useful, needs to have some
sort of organization. The more organized the group, the more likely the group will
succeed in its task. The third is resource mobilization, which is in itself a social
movement theory that will be discussed later in this chapter. A group must attract
people, money, equipment, and various assets to its cause. The fourth is opportunity.
A group must have the opportunity to act; otherwise they will not be able to invoke
any social change.
These four factors are important in any collective action, no matter how
intricate it becomes, and are essential for a social movement to even originate, let
alone flourish. But there are differences between collective action and social
movements. Tilley [1978] points out some differences between basic collective
behavior versus a social movement, which will be discussed in the next section.

Social Movements Defined
Though there are several definitions of social movements in the literature,
only a few will be discussed in this chapter. The first definition describes social
movements as a form of collective action; however, their ability to become
institutionalized and organized is what sets them apart from other types of collective
action [Traugott, 1978]. Traugott also describes social movements as being
organized, acting deliberately and making persistent efforts to change some aspect of
society. Whereas Traugott depicts social movements as an entity that is apart from
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other forms of collective actions, Foss' [1986] definition clearly illustrates his belief
that a social movement is a continuation or growth that arises from collective
behavior. Foss [1986] says that a social movement is "the developing collective
action of a significant portion of the members of a major social category" [Foss,
1986:2]. Foss sees a social movement not as something different from a collective
action, but something that is born out of a collective action.
Whether or not a social movement is different from other collective actions or
a continuation of one, there are very definite differences. Zald and McCarthy [ 1987]
cite four important differences between collective actions and social movements.
First, collective behavior is transitory. Collective actions tend to be less stable and
somewhat more spontaneous, whereas social movements are long lasting. Second,
collective action is unplanned. They do not have a set of ideologies or plans that are
in place, whereas social movements are generally purposeful and goal oriented with
organized plans of action. Third, collective action is more free form, whereas social
movements are more structured. Social movements have an organization or
institutional structure of leaders and hierarchy, divisions of labor within the
movement, and a more focused agenda. Finally, collective action generally involves
small numbers of people, whereas social movements generally have a much larger
membership.
In reading these various definitions and differences, there are many aspects of
all these definitions that clearly have significant merit; however, for the purpose of
this paper another working definition will be submitted:
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A social movement is a developed collective action,
organized with hierarchy of leadership and significant
membership that develops their agenda, sets ideology and
proposes methods for change in a plan of action.

Types ofSocial Movements
Now that a working definition for social movements has been established,
there are five basic types of social movements that shall be introduced in this chapter.
They are Reactionary, Reform, Expressive, Resistant and Revolutionary movements.
Yago [1989] provides a good description of these movements.
Reactionary movements 'react' to certain changes within the social structure.
They work to re-establish the structure as it was previous to these societal changes.
Reform movements are basically satisfied with the way things are; however, they
seek changes that will strengthen the existing social structure. Expressive movements
concentrate on people or attitudes within the movement. These movements work to
help change the attitudes of the members in order to better cope with the outside
world, frequently offering some good rewards that will be received in the future.
Resistant movements are more aggressive in their approaches than the preceding
types of movements. Resistant movements not only seek to change the current social
structure, but also work to block change or eliminate instituted changes. Finally,
Revolutionary movements, certainly the most notorious historically of the five types,
are the most determined to change the status quo. This movement type advocates
replacement of the current social structure and works towards changing the structure
to fit their ideology. These group members are by far the most dissatisfied, the most
oppressed, and have the least to lose compared to the members of other movements or
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ofthe general public, which leads to the diligent and fearless nature ofthese groups
[Vago, 1989]. Within this type of movement exists the 'terrorist' groups, which are
comprised mostly ofteenagers or young adults who experience strong deprivation,
powerlessness and helplessness that festers into rage [Reich, 1990]. Terrorism has
been defined as the "use offorce or violence against persons or property to intimidate
or to coerce a government, a formal organization or a civilian population in
furtherance ofa political, religious or social objective" [Hughes, 1999, 459]. With
this definition, it could be argued that most likely every hegemon in the history ofthe
world has engaged to one degree or another in a form of terrorism. Certainly in
recent history the impact ofevents that are carried out by these 'terrorist' groups are

.

extremely tragic for countless people who are victimized by these acts, and it is
certainly not the intention ofthis author to diminish the seriousness ofthese tragic
circumstances. However, for the purpose ofthis analysis ofHizb'allah, which has
been characterized by several authors and news media outlets as a 'terrorist group',
this term will not be used to describe this or any other movement. The term terrorist
is very subjective and carries many faces, and depends entirely on which 'side' you
are on.
It is clear, however, from these types ofsocial movements that it is not how
big, or how organized the social movement is, or what type ofcause they are fighting
for, but how they go about invoking change and how it relates to the current social
structure that determines their 'type'. There are basic elements that determine the
tactics used by a social movement and how they will proceed with their objectives;
Vago [1989] lists three.
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The first is how the group relates to their 'target', including their position
against the target group and what type of opposition they may incur. Second, the
social movement's beliefs and value structure determines in large part how they will
go about invoking change. If they are an anti-war movement, for example, most
likely their approach [in theory, anyway] will not involve guerrilla tactics, but rather
peaceful demonstrations. The third factor is how the social movement is seen by the
general public. They may not be looking for approval from every member of society,
but if they intend to become a mainstream element in the landscape of that society,
they need to take care with the type of tactics used towards their target. Hizb'allah,
for example, has been able to achieve and maintain some level of legitimacy in
Lebanon for two reasons. First, the guerilla tactics they used during the Civil War
and afterwards were used against a common Lebanese enemy [Israel and the West]
and not within the Lebanese population, and, second, they reached out with social
programs to help the impoverished people in the communities.
If a movement is using violence as part of their tactics, Yago [1989] suggests
some steps that a social movement must pass through to obtain approval for using
violence against their target. The first step is to increase the perception of relative
deprivation. Let the group members know how much better off other people are, and
how little the members of the group have and therefore have little to lose. The group
de-emphasizes the rewards and benefits to be gained by their current position, instead
focusing on the plight that they face. The group also emphasizes the discrepancy
between what the members have versus what the 'others' have, which with the
increase in this discrepancy also increases the feelings of frustration and rage.
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The second step is to intensify the anger of the group. This is done simply by
emphasizing the deprivation of the group, preaching to the group that their goals are
desirable and deserved, and that their current status is horrific and needs a drastic
measure to change for the better. This second level introduces the idea of taking
action to achieve their goals.
The third is for the group to emphasize the social variables that transform
anger into violence. This is done by giving examples of other violent groups and
their achievements, emphasizing the group's social ties to each other, and
emphasizing their shared deprivation which only intensifies the feeling of complete
hopelessness when shown as a group. In the case ofHizb'allah, it was rather easy to
justify violence within this group, since the environment in Lebanon during the Civil
War was nothing but groups committing violent acts against other groups, and, in the
larger structure of the Arab world, Islamic groups fundamentally viewed violence as a
means to an end, and someone who died carrying out these violent acts for their cause
was seen as a martyr.
If the environment is ripe with violence and the leaders of the group can
successfully cultivate the collective feeling of hopelessness and deprivation, then
violence becomes an acceptable tactic in achieving their goals.

Theoretical Models ofSocial Movements
There are countless theories that deal with the phenomenon of social
movements; however, there were five theories that kept coming to the forefront of the
literature: Deprivation or Relative Deprivation Theory, Mass Society Theory,
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Structural Strain Theory, Political Process Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory.
When reviewing these theories, something very interesting emerged. The first four
theories all dealt with basically the same question: 'why do social movements
emerge?' However, the Resource Mobilization Theory had less to do with 'why'
social movements emerged, but rather 'how' they were able to maintain their
movement.

Relative Deprivation Theory
Relative deprivation is looking at others and realizing they have much more
than you do, whether it is political power, economic freedom, religious freedom or
social status. The deprived then begin to resent the others and want what those other
people have. There are certain fundamental values people aspire to have, according
to Foss [1986]. The first is welfare values, or to have economic and psychological
well being. The second is power, or the ability to participate in decisions affecting
one's life and security. The third is interpersonal values, which is how we are
perceived by others in the community, our status and respectability, and our family
structure. When people see others enjoying these values and are not able to enjoy
them for themselves, there develops a sense of injustice and resentment.
When people of the same background begin to realize that as a group they are
left out of these values, group mobilization begins. This certainly was the case with
Hizb'allah in Lebanon. Historically the Shi'a Muslims in Lebanon were politically
weak and had the highest rate of impoverishment, and organizing allowed this very
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weak communal group to gain strength and power that they had never been able to
attain.
Foss [1986] also discusses three types ofrelative deprivation. The first occurs
when the value capabilities ofa group decline but the expectations remain constant.
This occurs when a group experiences downward mobility. The second, aspirational
deprivation occurs when people are exposed to societies that have higher standards of
living that are not open to them. This can be seen both internationally and
domestically in the U.S. or any other wealthy country in the world. The third is
progressive deprivation, which is mood that is tied to a downturn in the economy.
With all ofthese explanations for social discord, this theory lacks the ability to
explain collective action. It does not identify or explain the spark that ignites people
into action. Throughout the course ofhistory there have been countless groups that
were better off than others, but many members ofthe oppressed group continued
throughout their lives very passively, without organizing, without protesting, without
revolution. What makes deprivation a reason for collective behavior or the
establishment ofa social movement? Ifthis theory would be an adequate
explanation, the United States with its staggering inequality would experience a
constant stream ofrevolutionary movements and distress.

Mass Society Theory
This theory posits that, when there is a breakdown in society, the environment
is ripe for social movements to begin. William Kornhauser [1959], the initial theorist
ofMass Society Theory, states that, when people feel isolated from their communities

14

and from each other, they will tend to group together to form social groups. When
there is a feeling of alienation and marginality felt by a large section of society,
people will join movements to escape the feeling of alienation. According to
Kornhauser [ 1959], Mass Society Theory stresses that the lack of social ties is what
drives people to social movements, not social inequality itself. The question
remains, however, about what happens when the dysfunction is in society, not the
individual. Mass Society Theory fails to explain
what brings people to feel this alienation, the societal downturns that occur that
enable this feeling of isolation. It also fails to prove that alienation is a determining
factor in collective behavior. Many people who feel isolated and marginalized may
never engage in collective behavior. Instead, they may live out their lives quietly
trying to survive.

Structural Strain Theory
When a society or a social structure is performing in a way that is counter to
how people expect it to work, structural strain occurs. Structural strain disrupts an
individual's psychological state, can be caused by changes in the social structure, and
can lead to attempts to change the societal structure. Strain may be a result of events
such as industrialization, urbanization, or a declining economy, including high rates
of unemployment or changes in status [Smelser, 1963].
Structural Strain theory also deals with alienation, but focuses more on the
society rather than just the individual. According to Smelser [1963], when strain
exists, people shift their attention to a higher order to help them with their strain,
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which can lead to joining social movements. Smelser identifies six factors that
encourage the development of social movements.
The first factor is structural conduciveness. When people begin to see
problems in their current social structure, their perceptions become focused on what
they believe to be serious problems that need to be addressed and on changes that
need to be made. Structural strain is the next factor of Smelser's preconditions for
organizing a social movement. People experience relative incongruence between
what society is giving them and what they expect. The third factor is the growth and
spread of an explanation for the problems that are facing society. It is basically the
beginning of the ideological development of the movement, including what the group
believes, a clear statement of what the problem is, what caused these problems, and
the solutions for the problem.
Any social discontent can linger in a society for an infinite amount of time,
but what usually turns discontent into organized action is some sort of triggering
event. Perhaps a new law that the group feels is unjust is passed or an unfavorable
leader is elected or simply takes over, or, in the case of Hizb'allah, the Israeli Army

.

invades the South of Lebanon. All these things can take what is basic discontent, no
matter how serious the issue, and turn that discontent into action.
The fifth precondition that must be met is the mobilization of people. This is
somewhat different than Resource Mobilization Theory in that Smelser discusses the
mobilization of people without discussing how people and resources are maintained.
Until people begin organizing around their issues, creating their venues for promoting
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their cause, and mobilizing money and people, the group stands little chance to grow
into an organized movement that can enable change.
The final condition is the amount ofsocial control that is brought to bear on
the group. Ifa group is able to develop, organize and function without the
government's intervention to destroy the movement, it stands a better chance of
success. Ifa government is in disarray and there is little social control over anything,
there is little chance that the movement will be stunted. Again, in Lebanon during the
Civil War, many movements were able to develop and flourish since the government
had little control over the country, let alone the many para-military organizations that
were establishing themselves.
This theory also lends itselfto the idea ofMerton's Anomie and alienation;
without sufficient social ties, people tend to look elsewhere to find social acceptance
because they are unsure ofwhat is expected in the larger social structure.

When a

social structure is in disarray, people will look to whatever type ofauthority may be
able to help them cope with the disparity between what is available and what is
perceived as what they should have [Merton, 1968].
The basic criticism offered has been that Structural Strain Theory is
incomplete. Like the Mass Society Theory, it offers answers as to 'why' people may
mobilize when the environment that is ripe for mobilization and discontent, but it
overlooks the importance ofresource recruitment [Oberschall, 1973], which will be
addressed in Resource Mobilization Theory.
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Political Process Model
The Political Process Model emphasizes the political reasons behind
mobilization, as opposed to the psychological reasons that have been described in the
other theories [McAdam, 1982]. This theory identifies another rationale behind
mobilization, that perhaps it is not necessarily that the social structure is strained or
dysfunctional, but rather that people are searching for a way to be heard and have
some political power over their lives. Of course, if you look at many revolutionary
movements, they most certainly turn their sights on political power and persuasion,
not just selected issues within a society. According to McAdam (1982], there are
three determinants of a social movement within this framework: political
opportunities, organization and cognitive liberation.
Political opportunities are a crucial issue that must be addressed. Opportunity
can basically be described as an environment that will accept into it adversarial
movements or ideologies challenging the status quo. Events such as wars,
industrialization, political change, and a changing economy can leave an environment
vulnerable, and create opportunities for social movements to take hold. If the
environment is highly secure, it is much harder for the groups to mobilize and bring
about change. If there are cracks in the governmental structures that confine these
types of challenges, the environment is vulnerable for political change.
The strength of the organization is also an important aspect of this theory.
People must be organized in order to be successful in their attainment of change.
Finally, people must believe that things can actually change, which is cognitive

18

liberation. If they believe that what they are fighting for is hopeless and will never
succeed, they are less likely to mobilize and attempt to make changes 1982].
The basic criticism of this theory is that people do not always mobilize for
political gain. There are various groups that seek change on one issue alone, not for
political power. It also undervalues the importance of resources in maintaining a
social movement [Hall, 1982]. This issue of resources is at the core of the next and
last theory being addressed in this thesis.

Resource Mobilization Theory
Whereas the other four theories focused on environmental and personal
dysfunctions or weaknesses that bring people together for change, Resource
Mobilization Theory tends to focus on the ways in which a social movement draws
resources to itself. Without people, money, equipment, etc., social movements would
be unable to perform their tasks. Anthony Oberschall [1973] believes that the success
or failure of a social movement relies on the movement's ability to utilize, mobilize
and recruit resources, including people.
How do social movements draw people into the fold? Zald and McCarthy
[1979] argue that people act upon their interests or their deprivation. If it is in their
best interest to join together with other people, they will be more likely to do this.
This idea also lends itself to the idea that people make rational choices in becoming a
part of a social movement. They are not joining irrationally, but have reasons and
believe that the rewards of their involvement outweigh the consequences of not
joining. Resourceful and charismatic leaders are essential in this task, as the leaders
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of the group convince people that joining together will bring about change.
Movements are more successful when they are able to recruit more people, and
individuals are more likely to join groups in which the members are similar to
themselves. Solidarity becomes a vital aspect for leaders to create and maintain
within the group.
According to Zald and McCarthy [1979] there are five factors that constitute
how social movements are able to achieve solidarity within the group. The first is by
having friends and relatives in the group. If individuals are surrounded by people
from their personal life that they trust, they are more likely to become part of a
collective action. Level of participation within the group is also important. If a
person feels they have invested time or money into an organization, they are more
likely to stay and work within that group. If the group offers the individual
improvements in their daily lives, they are more likely to join. Again, collective
behavior involves giving up some of those individual choices and acting on behalf of
the group, but if the group enhances and improves those daily life issues, the
individual will be more willing to join. Again, rational cost and benefit analysis takes
place within the person's thought process. The fourth factor involves how an
individual is measured in terms of status both within the group and outside the group.
Subordinate and super
• ordinate roles are established, which creates cohesiveness to
the group. The last factor involves being readily identified with the group, so that
leaving the group would be difficult, on many levels. If belonging to the group has
aided the person in achieving their social stature, leaving the group would alienate
them from that particular status role. All of these factors illustrate how a person
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becomes attracted to a group, and how they remain members of that group after
enrollment.
The other aspect of Resource Mobilization Theory is the attainment of support
for the movement. Money, as well as other types of material items such as weaponry
and equipment, is all essential to the success of a social movement. How does a
movement, especially if it is drawn from a pool of deprived individuals, obtain such
wealth and material? Extremely deprived groups are more dependent upon external
supports for their mobilization. In order to secure this type of funding, a movement
must present itself as very well organized, it must present an ideology that is
attractive to the investors in the movement, and it must offer more to the investors
than what the investors are putting into the movement. There is in rational thought an
idea that someone will not put more into something than what they expect to get out
of it. This is also applicable to investors in social movements. For instance, Iran
heavily funded Hizb'allah with money, weaponry, religious leaders and soldiers for
training, all because Iran felt that Hizb'allah was delivering what Iran wanted: the
removal of Israel and the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon. When Hizb'allah
put aside the platform of the Islamic state, funding from Iran began to diminish. No
I
longer was Iran going to fund Hizb'allah if Iran was not going
to benefit.

There are two criticisms regarding Resource Mobilization Theory. One is
that, if the idea is that the more deprived individuals are, the more likely they are to
engage in collective behavior, how would they be able to gain the powerful people to
support their movement? Many social movements are well executed by relatively
powerless people in the community. The second criticism of Resource Mobilization
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Theory is that it overstates the ability of these movements to gain support from
powerful people who are not likely to move away from the status quo. After all, the
powerful elite already have what they want.

Summary of Theories
One thing that has become evident from examining Social Movement Theory
is that no one theory is complete. They either explain why a social movement would
be established, who would be likely to engage in collective behavior, the steps they
would take to establish a social movement, or how they are able to attract members
and money. These are very important questions to be answered, but what seems to be
missing is a theoretical model that handles all these questions or a holistic explanation
for the creation and continued success of a social movement. Perhaps it does not
work that way, and you need to find several theories to answer different parts of the
same question.
In an attempt to provide an encompassing theoretical explanation for Social
Movements, there are key points in each of these theories that contribute to the
overall picture of why Social Movements emerge, how they function, and how they
continue to exist.

By taking a chronological view of social movements, there are

three stages that will be highlighted here: the Precondition Stage, or the atmosphere
and environment before the birth of a movement, the creation of a Social Movement,
and the continuation of the Social Movement, or its ability to maintain itself after
creation.
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Mass Society Theory, Structural Strain Theory and the Political Process
Model all identify factors that are vital in the Pre-Social Movement environment, or
what preconditions are most common for a Social Movement to originate. Mass
Society Theory places the emphasis on society, explaining that there is a breakdown
in society, making people feel alienated and marginalized. Structural Strain also
identifies societal elements that are present; however, the difference between the two
is that Structural Strain makes a point to state that the people are aware of the decline
of the societal structure. Mass Society does not mention that the people are aware of
the problems, just that they feel the anxiety because society is not functioning
properly. Structural Strain emphasizes the awareness within the affected population.
Political Process Model takes less of the societal structure into consideration, but
focuses instead on the targeted population's feeling of being politically weak and
powerless.
To integrate these factors chronologically, we can say that the environment of
being politically weak is already present when there is a breakdown in the social
structure affects people's psychological states, making them feel isolated and
marginalized. All of these factors highlight a breakdown in societal structures that
cause people to feel alienated and helpless. There certainly is a causal relationship
between what is happening in society, especially when things are seriously
disorganized, and how people begin to feel. Smelser [1963] makes this causal
pattern clear when he states that, when the societal structure is strained, this affects
people's psychological states. If this were true, it would also be true that people's
psychological states are affected when societal structure is good.
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Although these are critical ideas in the birth of a Social Movement, these
elements have been present in many places throughout the world and throughout
history, yet no Social Movement was created. These aspects may describe the
environmental atmosphere that is conducive to the creation of Social Movements;
however, they do not explain why the Social Movement is created, when so many
other times a Social Movement was not. In the end, even though these conditions are
present when a Social Movement is created, these conditions can also be present
without Social Movements as well.
Why a social movement materializes is a different subject altogether. Mass
Society Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Structural Strain and Resource
Mobilization Theory all provide important explanations about why a movement
originates. With Mass Society Theory, lack of social ties causes people to seek out
others who share the same ideas. According to Kornhauser [1959] people tend form
social groups if they are feeling alienated and will search for others who may be
sharing the same isolation. Relative Deprivation Theory offers the idea that, once a
group is getting together, they begin to realize that they do not have as much as
others. Structural Strain also stresses that, once a small group comes together, they
begin to explain their problems away by blaming others. Resource Mobilization
Theory offers the idea that charismatic leadership is needed to organize an effective
group. Then when a triggering event happens, the small group that has originated is
able to procure more legitimacy because this event has caused people to feel more
despair and actively look to this new organized group to help ease the problems
before them. So in the origination process people's feelings of isolation drive them

24

towards forging alliances with social groups, and these groups perpetuate feelings of
legitimacy for their suffering, blame others for their problems [sometimes true,
sometimes scapegoating], the small group realizes that they are deprived of
something important to them, and strong leadership makes sure all these concepts are
strongly emphasized to the group. Then when a triggering event happens, it
legitimizes all that the group has come to believe, and their resolve for change is
stronger than ever. A Social Movement is born.
The final aspect of Social Movement Theory deals with the success of a
Social Movement. That is, how is a Social Movement, once established, is able to
continue? It is simple to say 'Xis a Social Movement'; but how does Xkeep itself
together? Political Process and Resource Mobilization Theories both offer ideas on
how Social Movements are able to survive. Political opportunities, good organization
and a strong ideology are essential to the existence of a Social Movement according
to the Political Process Model. A group may be large in number, but if they are not

....
well organized,
are unaware of the opportunities that unfold in front of them, and do
not have a sense of their purpose, they will not survive, or will not develop at all.

•
Resource
Mobilization Theory explains the essential need for people and money.
Without recruiting members and having money to maintain the movement, it will not
survive very long.
Each theory in itself is incomplete; it only answers [or tries to explain] only
one aspect of Social Movements. Crudely, however, by chronologically placing the
life of a social movement in these three stages, it becomes apparent that no one theory
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can explain every stage; however, the ideas presented in these theories are important
pieces of the overall picture of a Social Movement's existence.
The point to this particular section is to illustrate that, throughout the
chronological history of a social movement, each of these theories provides bits and
pieces that contribute to an explanation of a social movement's creation and success.
It is rather simple to take these particular factors and apply them historically to a
social movement; however, each of these theories individually scrutinized would not
be able to predict the emergence of a social movement. Is it possible to link all these
factors, to somehow create a 'recipe' for an atmosphere that is receptive to the creation
and establishment of a social movement, and be able to predict an emergence of a
movement? This is a far more interesting sociological question.
One way of looking at these theoretical ideas is by looking at the life course of
Social Movements to see what kind of pattern emerges. With this chronology we
may be able to apply these theories and see how they impact the flow of these
movements.

Life Course ofSocial Movements
Yago [ 1989] describes five stages in the life of a social movement:
Incipiency, Coalescence, Institutionalization, Fragmentation and Demise. During
each of these stages, a social movement changes in many ways.
The first stage, incipiency, is the early stages of a movement. Some social
unrest or condition is festering that threatens some group in society. A few people
begin advocating for change and begin developing their ideology. Within this
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ideology they establish their method of operation, and the leaders test the members'
level of commitment. Charismatic leaders must find a way of attracting new
members to this group. They do this by stressing the social problems that they are
facing and offering a way in which to invoke change. They must provide realistic
solutions for this change to invoke interest and commitment as well. If the goals are
unrealistic, they will not ensure a strong commitment among members of the group.
In the coalescence stage, small groups begin to form around the core leaders
and they begin to develop a pattern of organization. They may fragment themselves
into various parts of the movement, and a definitive pattern of hierarchy is
established. During this period resources become mobilized.
Institutionalization is perhaps the most intricate stage in Social Movements.
This is also clearly the turning point for legitimization. This is the stage where the
social movement becomes stronger, more stable and accepted as part of the society.
The organizational structure of a social movement is very fragmented, composed of
many cells or subsections that carry out certain duties. All the various segments are
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brought together under the same umbrella of the social movement and its ideology.
One of the clear disadvantages of institutionalization, however, is the lack of
central control that was once possessed by a small number of people. Now that there
are many 'departments' or groups, fragmentation can weaken the organization.
Bureaucratization is not always successful, and certainly institutionalization, when it
happens, will be the biggest test for the long-term life and success of a social
movement. The last stage is demise. After an organization begins breaking down
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from having the power decentralized, they can lose whatever power they may have
had in the past.
So how does a social movement maintain its success and avoid moving to the
demise stage quickly? Is institutionalizatim a sure sign that the movement will fail?
Gladys and Kurt Lang [1961] outline structural problems that need to be addressed in
an organization to protect its longevity. The first step that must be taken is
establishing roles and role functions, including knowing who the leaders and the
followers are, their roles, and their functions. The second is coordinating the
relationship among the various groups within the movement, including setting
boundaries, outlining duties and leadership responsibilities, and establishing a good
sense of communication between these groups. Another factor is to establish criteria
for membership in the core group and the obligations for membership. The final
structural problem that must be resolved is coordinating the activities of the
movement and its dealings with the outside world. To be separate within the group is
one thing, but a social movement that seeks to remain intact must present a unified
front to the outside world.
All of these problems are usually dealt with based on the group's ideology.
Ideology is perhaps the single most important and definitive part of a social
movement. Ideology establishes the group's values and norms, and acts as its
official doctrine. [Gladys and Kurt Lang, 1961].
Ideology is a collection of many things. It is a statement of purpose for the
social movement to exist, it outlines the problems that the movement has with the
established order, it provides a blueprint for its method of operation, and, finally, it
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offers the members a new set of values and norms that are representative of the
movement. Ideologies are one defining element of each type of social movement.
For instance, Political Movements are social movements; however, what
distinguishes them as Political Movement is their ideology. That is, political goals
and their belief system about what should be changed within a political structure is
what sets them apart from other social movements. All political movements are
social movements; however, not all social movements end up being political
movements. Ideology is only part of what makes up a social movement, however.
There are many characteristics of a social movement that come into play in
determining its potential success or its demise.

Characteristics ofa Social Movement
There are six basic characteristics of social movements. They are
organization and opposition, recruitment, charismatic leadership, tactics used for
change, and seeking public approval.
One thing a social movement has, like any other collective action, is an issue
to address. There must be some issue that that is the focus of the group's discontent.
They make their target very clear, and take steps to establish themselves as an
adversary of the status quo and of the opposing group. A strong social movement
makes their agenda very clear. What they are opposed to, how things should be, and
how they go about changing these things really are all part of the group's ideology.
Recruitment is vital to any social movement. Social movements cannot exist
without members. In order to provide a movement with members, and resources, a
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.
social movement must be able to recruit people. How they recruit people can be as
complex as the movement itself; however, Hall [1988] suggests a few ideas. First,
the group must let the potential members know how they may benefit by being part of
the group. If the social structure is in strain of some sort, the movement may offer to
the individual something they are not able to attain on their own. Second, leaders
must get members and potential members to believe in their cause and be committed
to it. The more the leaders stress the problems that afflict the group and establish a
way to make things better, the easier it will be to get people to join with the
movement. Third, if the potential members are of the same background as the rest of
the group, they are more likely to join. For instance, the same ethnic or religious
affiliation would be similarities that would draw individuals to a social movement.
They may already have the issues of discontent in common, but the more 'alike' the
individuals of the group are, the more cohesive the group becomes. Finally, a
spiritual hierarchy is also on Hall's list, with those being in roles of authority having a
higher moral status than other members. This last issue of Halls' takes into account
the next characteristic, which is that a social movement must have charismatic
leaders. Leaders need to have the power to make the oppression a real issue that
needs to be addressed. They need to be believed and respected. The leaders need to
be almost bigger than life, as they epitomize the greatness that this movement will
achieve.
Tactics are also part of the ideology of the movement. It is not necessarily the
goal of the movement that matters, but the way in which the group works towards its
goals. The means are just as important as the end result.

30

Finally, in order to obtain legitimacy in the society and to be able to fulfill its
goals, a movement must at some level gain public approval. This is not to say that
they need to be accepted by everyone, but an acceptance in mainstream society of
their existence is necessary. For instance, not everyone approves of Hizb'allah, but
the population of Lebanon accepts its existence in the country.

Literature Review
In reviewing other researchers in the field of social movement case study
research, a few different are worth mentioning here. In Ziad Munson's [2001]
analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, he combines various theoretical
elements of social movement theories such as relative deprivation and anomie,
arguing that these factors explain why the Muslim Brotherhood mobilized. Munson
also explains the movements' rapid growth using literature on political Islam and
political opportunity, though he does not exclusively characterize this movement as a
political or religious movement. Pasuk Phongpaichit [1999] distinguishes between
two camps of theories, one American and one European, and reads conclusions
similar to those of Munson [2001]. Cathy Schneider [2000] discusses social
movements in South America by doing a comparative study of three different case
studies in Chile, Argentina and Columbia. One focus she maintained throughout her
analysis was the political nature of these movements. By providing a somewhat
journalistic history to these movements, she illustrates the differences in how these
movements were created. For instance, in Argentina the grass roots movement was
created from the bottom of the social structure and worked upwards. In Chile, the
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leaders in their Churches and communities directed movements. One conclusion that
Schneider draws is very important to understanding the nature of any social
movement: the critical roles that the environment and space in which the movement
originates. These external factors certainly do shape the agenda and ideology of the
movement, as well as the mindset of the resistors [Schneider, 2001].

Conclusion
If there is one conclusion for this chapter, it is that there is no one explanation
for anything. If a journalistic approach to this question of social movements is taken,
the theories separately do not really answer the 'who,what,when,where, why and
how' of social movements. But, if combined, these theories have some common
threads that address how social movements work and why they are successful.
For the theoretical aspect, the type of environment and psychological state of
people who partake in movements have been made clear. The dysfunction of the
societal structure, the dissatisfaction of people, and their social positions all play an
integral part for the creation of social movements. Triggering events that and the
recruitment and procurement of resources enable a movement to establish itself and
maintain activity.
To begin to understand social movements, a review of what other people have
said about them is crucial. To look at these theories, what they stand for, and what
they are criticized for is essential to begin building new ideas. Though many ideas
have been brought to this chapter, if there is one word that could characterize the
main artery, or that common thread, through these social movement models, it is
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vulnerability. Though vulnerability sounds rather negative, not all social movements
are negative. In order for a social movement to emerge, recruit members, and
eventually succeed, individuals and society alike must be vulnerable to their
emergence.
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Chapter3
History of a Nation
Introduction
This chapter is to briefly introduce the reader to the country of Lebanon. The
history of this region goes back thousands of years, through many hegemonic powers
controlling this prime coastal land in the Middle East, a brief period of independence,
and finally through the contemporary struggles Lebanon is facing today for complete
sovereignty. Even though by decree Lebanon became an independent state in 1943,
this chapter will illustrate this small country's current struggle to free itself from yet
another controlling power.
Lebanon's history has been characterized by periods of great economic growth
and success, only to be followed by severe problems. This chapter will illustrate
patterns of weakness and vulnerability through historical analysis of the processes
that have left Lebanon vulnerable to the devastating periods of unrest and economic
turmoil that the Lebanese people have been socialized to endure and accept as status
quo.

Phoenicia East
As far back as 500 BC [ and before] there was struggle for world domination,
and the land that came to be known as Lebanon was not free of this struggle. At the
time of the Phoenicians, a people whose common history was that of seafarers
throughout ports in the Mediterranean, they were one of the dominant people in the
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known world. The Phoenicians were premiere seamen, establishing small
civilizations throughout the Mediterranean shores and as far south as the African
coast. The Phoenicians were also skilled tradesmen. They had developed ideas that
they brought back from many lands, learned from other ports, and applied their
knowledge to their homeland. Over the course of several hundred years, the
Phoenicians became incredibly powerful, becoming a prime target for many other
groups. In the end, the Greeks, led by Alexander the Great, won the land of the
Phoenicians [Edey, 1974].
Why was a greater, more powerful group able to conquer what was one of the
most diversified and progressive cultures of their time? One reason is space.
Phoenicia was not one concentrated, populated area that they could defend; Phoenicia
comprised small ports throughout the Mediterranean. Even in the land that became
Lebanon, Phoenicia East was not one group, but several small ones. The only factor
that held the Phoenicians together and that made them one people was their sea
travels from port to port. Otherwise the Phoenician cities were quite separate from
each other. Eastern Phoenician cities remained politically independent of each other,
each looking after their own interest [Harden, 1962]. The Sidonians, the Tyrians, etc.
had their own governments, their own kingdoms, and their own wealth [Baramki,
1961]. There was never a Phoenician nation; if there had been more political unity
between the separate kingdoms, perhaps their ability to ward off invaders would have
been greater. They became vulnerable to large armies simply because of their size,
and in the end Alexander the Great's army was able to control all of Phoenicia East
with little resistance. Even at this time, we begin to understand the weaknesses and
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consequences of division, something that has never been understood by the Lebanese
in general.

The Christian andDruze Migration
Throughout the next several hundred years, many leading groups sought to
control this piece of land. During this period [during the mid 7th Century], Islam was
born, which led to incredible changes throughout this region of the world, and
subsequently led to changes in what was to be known as Lebanon. In what later was
called Mount Lebanon, there were different groups that found their way from other
lands and came to call the mountain their home.
TheDruze
The Druze, a very small community who were originally Shi'a Muslim,
developed their own identity in the 11th century and originated in Egypt [Harik,
1968]. When this religion, whose conception revolved around the teachings of a
Shi'a caliph al-Hakim [Gordon, 1983] did not meet with much success in Egypt, the
Druze began migrating to Syria and the south of Lebanon [Harik, 1968]. Though by
the 16th Century the Druze were well established in many places throughout Lebanon,
for the period between the inception of the religion during the 11th Century and the
16th Century, the number of people who migrated and the process of migration are not
documented and remain a mystery [Harik, 1968].
The Druze are a very secretive, tight knit group. One can only be born into
the group, and they reject anyone who attempts to convert [Gordon, 1983]. The
Druze established themselves primarily in the region of Wadial Tayn, Jabal al Shuf
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and al Gharb in Mount Lebanon [Harik, 1968]. Although their religion was based in
Islamic beliefs, they developed an amicable relationship with the Christian migrants
who also were coming to the region, although they maintained their independent
community.
The Maronites
The first Christian group to migrate to Mount Lebanon were the Maronites.
Maronites, who took their name from the 4th century monk Marin [Gordon, 1983],
originated in central Syria and migrated to Mount Lebanon during two waves in the
7th and then the 9th centuries [Picard, 2002]. The Maronites had troubles with the
Byzantine government and the Jacobites in western Syria, so they began migrating
westward (Gordon, 1983]. During the crusades in Europe the Maronites began
identifying more with their western Christian counterparts and began resenting the
Islamic political authority that was imposed on them [Picard, 2002].

During the

next few hundred years the Maronite community expanded their living area
throughout Mt. Lebanon, and by the 1 ?1h and 18th Centuries they began migrating
south, displacing many Shi' a from their land [Gordon, 1983].

The Druze and Maronite C�existence
With both of these group's migration, however, came isolation. Each group
lived amongst themselves and had little business outside of their own villages
[Gordon, 1983]. Though they kept to themselves, the Druze and Christians were able
to live relatively close but maintain their own sovereignty with little trouble from the
other groups. Instead of trying to build a stronger unity within the area, both decided

37

it was best to live independently of each other. With the exception of a few disputes,
sometimes erupting into violence, both groups lived peacefully, though separately.
Certainly there were others who had originally been a part of this region, mostly
people who were descendants of the Phoenicians. Little is written about these
descendants during this period of Lebanese history. As time passed, more Muslims
began migrating to the area, and eventually Mt. Lebanon was taken over by the
Ottoman Empire, which ruled for over 400 years.

The Ottoman Empire
The Ottomans, whose origin was geographically in what is now Turkey, were
a large group who had converted to Sunni Muslim and had taken over the area that is
now known as the Middle East. The Ottomans first took over the area in the typical
military fashion; however during the course of the 16th Century, after their rule had
been established, the Ottomans took on a more bureaucratic type of control [Hourani,
1991]. Under the Ottomans there began a significant migration of Muslims to
Lebanon over the course of the Empire's reign. There were clashes between various
groups from time to time with some very deadly outbreaks of violence, but eventually
each group would return to their own area. The tradition of self-segregation was
firmly in place at this time.
The Ottomans established their rule in a very systematic process. As new
lands were acquired, governors were appointed to cities and taxes were collected that
were income for the Ottomans [Hourani, 1991]. There were three 'regular' types of
taxes that were collected. The first were taxes on produce of the countryside: crops,
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fisheries and livestock. The second were taxes on the urban consumer trade. Produce
sold in markets, shops, bathhouses, industry, exports and imports were all taxed.
Also tolls on roads were collected, and the Ottomans established the first direct route
between Beirut and Damascus. The third tax was a personal tax that was paid by
Christians and Jews [Hourani, 1991]. The Ottomans were Islamic, and in their way
tolerated different religious groups, but did not allow them to become landowners.
The Ottomans did allow other groups very limited sovereignty over their own areas,
with the Ottoman municipality type government in place [Gordon, 1983]. The Druze
and Muslim groups did not have to pay personal taxes and were allowed more
autonomy in their own municipalities [Hourani, 1991]. The Druze also were able to
establish a level of control over the Christians, with the permission and approval of
the Ottomans [Gordon, 1983].
There were several significant events that changed the environment in
Lebanon during the 19th Century. The first was the invasion and short-lived rule of
Lebanon by Egypt, which lasted nine years [1831-1840]. Egyptian rule was more
tolerant of the communal groups, particularly the Christians. One major contribution
Egypt gave to the Christians was the ability to become landowners. Egypt also was
impressed by the West and followed their lead by encouraging education and
commerce [Gordon, 1983]. The Ottomans regained power over Egypt in 1840, but
changes Egypt encouraged created many more problems for the Ottomans. Once the
Egyptians left, the Christians and Druze clashed violently when the Druze tried to re
establish their control over the Christians. The Christians had been able to enjoy the
fruits of freedom, and they were not going to give them up without a fight. With
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these violent outbreaks, Europe intervened with a compromise. Called the 'Double
Quaimaqamiate', this compromise left the north under Maronite control, and the
south under Druze control [Gordon, 1983]. This appeared, at least on paper, to be a
solution to the ever-growing animosity between the groups. However, populations of
both groups overlapped in these areas, which left many Maronite peasants working
for Druze landowners. In 1859 Maronites rebelled in the Peasant Revolt. The Druze,
encouraged by the Ottomans and the British, massacred the Maronites, and in a four
week period, over 11,000 Maronites perished [Gordon, 1983]. However tragic this
event was, it sparked changes that were designed to establish equal rights for all
communal groups in Lebanon. Between 1861-1864 a constitutional arrangement was
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made that abolished feudalism as a system of tax gathering and was to provide
Christians with political power that had up to that point been non-existent [Gordon,
1983]. This was all part of a greater reform movement, the Tanzimat, that lasted until
the end of the 19th century [Gordon, 1983]. By the turn of the century, the Ottomans
had established in Lebanon a legacy of bureaucracy, tax collection, and a varied
amount of political equality, depending on the communal group. This idea of
providing political power based on religious identity [although the amount of power
would change between the groups] would become one of the defining issues that
would plague Lebanon throughout the next century.
The Ottoman Empire disintegrated at the end of World War I. When
Germany lost the war, so did their allies, and the Ottoman Empire was over. Now
England and France primarily divided up these provinces into nations, allocating
power to groups friendly to the west, and created nation states within this area for the
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first time in this region's history. Lebanon became the property of the French
[Nevakivi, 1969].

A French Colony
After WWI the Middle East was now the property of Britain and its allies. The
Middle East was divided between the Allied powers, not unlike candy is divided up
between children at Halloween. Lebanon and Syria became the property of the
French [Nevakivi, 1969]. The people of this region had never been identified as part
of a 'country', and this created a large amount of resentment and opposition
[Nevakivi, 1969].
The first task of the French was to establish national boundaries. When
greater Lebanon was established in 1920, the Christians believed that this would
provide Lebanon with greater security and prosperity; however, the boundaries that
were drawn populated Lebanon with many more Muslims whose allegiance was to
Syria and the Arab Nationalist movement that was beginning to emerge, not to
Lebanon [Gordon, 1983]. To the Muslim population the French, and the Christians,
were unwanted elements in an Arab nation. France further aggravated the Muslims
by establishing French as the national language and ordering that it be the primary
language in education and government, which gave the Maronites [who had
established good relations with the French] an advantage in government [Gordon,
1983].
The governmental system under the French was a parallel system; one
Lebanese and republican and one French and imperial. France allowed the Lebanese
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government to exist so long as it did not create problems for the French interests
[Browne, 1976]. During this period the French encouraged the Lebanese annex of the
government to establish land registries, which gave actual property rights to
individual families [Gordon, 1983].
Lebanon was only a colony of France for approximately 25 years, but during
that time France was able to create an indelible mark on the culture and way of life in
Lebanon. To this day, Arabic and French are the national languages.

Lebanon as a Self-Governing Nation
In 1945 Lebanon became an independent state, or did it? There were still
countries vying for power in this small coastal country. The economy in Lebanon,
based mostly on private industries and with little government control, began to
flourish. However, there were foreign countries that would drive internal strife to an
all time high.
Never before in history had all these areas been divided into different
countries, setting boundaries between lands that had never before known boundaries,
and, further, not even by their own accord but by the decision of others [England and
France]. Once this 'nationalization' occurred, the west expected the people to simply
accept themselves as a citizen of a country, whether it was Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, or Lebanon. Centuries of identity were expected to vanish by drawing lines
on a map, and the people of these lands were supposed to assimilate themselves into
new national identities. In these countries, identity to one group or another is far more
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important than national identity, and communal identity in this region is paramount to
any other [Haddad, 1985].
In Lebanon, where the cultural norm had always been to isolate oneself from
outside groups, the idea of consolidating all the Christians, Druze and Muslims into
one category
of 'Lebanese' turned out to be impossible. This inability to have a
:..
unified national identity is consistent with the culture set forth for centuries in this
area, and when Lebanon became a country with national boundaries, there was still a
sense of isolation between people. With the increase in population at the turn of the
century in Beirut, these isolated people already had to adapt to cohabitation in
concentrated areas, although still separated into neighborhoods that are predominately
segregated even today. Their diversity made things strained and made establishing a
national identity and unity much more difficult [Gordon, 1983]. There were many
conflicts throughout the Middle East in attempting to reconcile themselves to their
new situation, but in a region like Lebanon, coming together as one had never been
accepted, and would in later years perpetuate conflict and disaster.
Lebanon had always been organized by communal groups [Picard, 2002].
They were tom apart by ideologies, which perpetuated distrust between the groups
with which they were now expected to assimilate; instead, each group attempted to
work separately [Haddad, 1985].
Some say that diversity creates strength, but diversity cannot create strength if
the people refuse to embrace and accept the differences in others and work together.
Working together is what makes diversity strong, and that is something the Lebanese
have never done. In fact, diversity drove them farther apart and made the result of
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these differences more extreme and violent than ever before, erupting in a 15-year
war that killed hundreds of thousands of Lebanese on all sides.

Arab Nationalism and U.S. Intervention
From the time the Middle East was divided by the western powers,
there was a political movement to create an Arab nationalist ideology. This ideology
was strongly embraced in the countries that were predominately Muslim; however,
Lebanon's population was more than half non-Muslim. When the idea of Arab
nationalism began appearing, this created an even bigger fragmentation in the
country. The Muslims wanted the Arab nationalist movement while the Christians
wanted western influence, as well as the money that came along with it. So
independence was immediately marred by conflict.
Egypt was one of the dominating countries at the time that was pushing for
Arab nationalism and was constantly at odds with Lebanon, doing whatever it could
to manipulate aid from western countries to Lebanon and to bring about rifts in the
political climate. In 1958 Egypt joined with Syria in the Arab nationalist movement
and was able to gain the support of the Lebanese Muslims, which brought about a
more fragmented society in Lebanon [Gordon, 1983]. The Christian groups in
Lebanon, particularly President Camille Chamoun, asked the west to intervene, as this
Arab nationalist movement was causing huge conflicts between groups, and finally
the Lebanese political leaders signed an agreement offered by the United States that
would give $20 million to the Lebanese government. By signing this agreement,
Chamoun created more division in the Lebanese state [Gordon, 1983]. Of course, the
United States and Britain were less concerned about a civil war in Lebanon than they
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were about thwarting the success of the Arab nationalists. When the United States
agreed to use military power in Lebanon and Jordan, Britain was relieved [Ovendale,
1996]. They, too, wanted to protect their interests in the region, but they were less
interested in taking such an active military role than they had been immediately after
the World War II. They wanted America to take over that 'big brother' role. The
Untied States took over as the 'watcher' of the region, which is exactly what Britain
wanted [Ovendale, 1996].
With western influence, Lebanon actually flourished. Over the next 25 years
Lebanon, primarily in the capital city of Beirut, became the banking center for the
Middle East [Picard, 2002]. Without the rich natural resources of the gulf countries,
or the size and strength of countries like Egypt and Syria, Lebanon needed to find its
niche where it could be successful. They achieved this in banking. Beirut also
became the cultural center of the region. With their rich history, their western
influence, and their diverse population, they became the bridge from the west to the
east. However, what is on the surface is not always how things really are. During
this period there were also internal struggles within the country, struggles that were
intensified by the pressure put forth by Syria. With the increase in migration of
various Muslim groups, particularly the Shi'a, there became an ever-increasing fight
for political and economic power. Another circumstance that arose in this migration
was that the Christian population was no longer the majority; the majority of the
population was now Muslim, and they wanted their share of political and economic
power.
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The Civil War
It is very interesting why this period of unrest and violence has been called a
'Civil War'. In reality, foreign influences shaped this conflict more than any group
within Lebanon. If anything, the Lebanese became more like chess pieces on a board
that the outside, more powerful nations played against each other. From 1975
through 1989 Lebanon fought a civil war that left the country devastated in many
ways. To go into detail on the Civil War would be another thesis altogether;
however, there are several points that lend themselves to the ideas that are relevant
for this paper.
During the 1950's and 1960's fighting and territorial disputes between various
groups within Lebanon were becoming more frequent, and more bloody. But the
worst was to come. The precursors of the Civil War of 1975 could arguably go back
centuries; however, certain events over the course of less than a decade lent
themselves to situations that kept perpetuating more violent acts. In 1967 Israel
waged a war with the Arabs that lasted only 6 days, and changed the demographic
landscape of Lebanon forever. Tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees were forced
out of Israel and migrated north to Lebanon and east to Jordan. The Palestinians
quickly gained the support and sympathy of the Muslim communities in their fight to
return to their homeland. Syria also agreed that the Palestinians had a right to fight
Israel, and supported attacks on Israel from the south of Lebanon for over eight years.
What was left was a small portion of the Christian population that did not want to go
to war with Israel, and eventually this small country, already fragmented by religious
and group ties, fell apart [Haddad, 1985]. For the next 15 years, Israel controlled
many of the Christian groups and Syria and Iran controlled the Muslims. What
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. a war between Israel and Syria, with financial and military
inevitably took place was

support from Iran, the United States, France and Italy, fought on Lebanese soil, using
the Lebanese people to fight, and having Lebanese casualties.
The war completely destroyed the Lebanese economy. Banks were closed,
their financial center was destroyed, and all ofBeirut was quartered off and turned
into para- military controlled blocks. With Lebanon transformed into a war zone, the
interests ofthe west were being placed in jeopardy. The United States, France, and
Italy all sent 'peace keeping' military forces to Beirut. The Syrians, Iranians, and
Lebanese Muslims saw these forces as Israeli pawns, and in October of1983, the
message to get out oftown was made perfectly clear. A truck carrying 1500 pounds
of explosives drove into the marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 American and over
50 French soldiers [Friedman, 1989]. The west left, leaving the Christians and the
Israelis to fight the Syrians, Iranians and the Lebanese Muslims. This is the first time
in the history of Lebanon that a hegemonic power, the United States, left Lebanon
and their interests there.
At the end ofthe war there were no epiphanies or resolutions; everyone was
tired oflosing so many members, living with the fear ofbeing killed everyday, of
suffering the economic turmoil and deprivation that the war had brought to their
country, and ofliving day to day in this surrealistic nightmare. Eventually, after 15
years of fighting, the Lebanese ended the war with the TaifAccord, but the two
stronger powers, Syria and Israel, continued to fight each other on Lebanese soil,
even though one ofthe conditions brought forth in Taif Accord was that foreign
powers were to evacuate Lebanon [Rubin, 2003]. Syria again used para military
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groups such as Hizb'allah to drive Israeli forces out of the south of Lebanon, and
finally, after eight years of guerilla warfare, Israel left [Rainstorp, 1997]. Currently
Syria still has military forces throughout Lebanon, they control and are supported by
many Parliament members, which leave many Lebanese feeling that Syria is holding
the Lebanese economic freedom hostage by their controls [Haddad, 1985].
In February of2005 former Prime Minister Rafik Harriri was assassinated in
downtown Beirut. Waves of protests followed, accusing Syrian Intelligence and
Military of perpetuating this act. There were International calls for Syrian
withdrawal, and President Bashir Assad of Syria complied. By April 26th , 2005,
Syrian troops and Intelligence Officers left Lebanon. With the Syrian troops leaving
Lebanon, will Lebanon be strong enough to free themselves from Syrian government
control? And if Lebanon is successful, who will be the next hegemon to come along
and control Lebanon in the future?

The Israeli and Syrian Post-War Occupation
The presence of Israeli troops in Lebanon was the one event throughout
history that forced a national unity among the Lebanese. Everyone wanted Israel to
leave; the question was, with the country in post-war turmoil, who was strong enough
to remove the Israeli forces and send them back south of the boarder? At this time,
Hizb'allah was still receiving money from Iran, and was the only group strong enough
to conduct consistent guerilla attacks against the Israeli army. Hizb'allah was able to
use their para-military forces to change the ratio of Israeli lives/Lebanese lives lost
from 1/100 to nearly 1/1 [Rainstorp, 1997]. Finally, in the summer of2000 when
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Israel left all but a few farms in the south of Lebanon, the whole country applauded,
and Hizb'allah took its place as hero of the Lebanese people, the one strong force who
fought the 'evil infiltrators'. On the coat tails of this notoriety, Hizb'allah was able to
secure even more political prestige and seats in the Parliament [Rainstorp, 1997].
Christians as well as Muslims voted for Hizb'allah because of their role in removing
Israel. In fact, Hizb'allah used this new position to begin bringing Christians and
Shi'a Muslims together against the Sunni's. Syria still controlled the Sunnis, and now
that Israel was gone, the Lebanese wanted the rest of the occupiers gone as well. The
problem with Syria was that the Sunni Muslims, and many other Parliament
members, still wanted Syrian influence inside Lebanon, whereas EVERYONE
wanted Israel gone. Even after a war that left all sides suffering from significant
losses, foreign occupation and takeover and economic struggles, Lebanon still has not
learned the obvious: to come together as a nation.
There are fundamental parts to the Lebanese story of missed opportunity. One
certainly is the bigger, stronger nations coming in and taking over, but the other has
to be the people of Lebanon and their historical inability to forge one nation. In fact,
in the end, the Lebanese problem, and its solution, lies completely in the hands of the
Lebanese people.
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Chapter4
Hizb'allah: Understanding the Party of God
Qur'anic verse V, 56
And whoever takes Allah and His apostle
and those who believe for a guardian,
then surely the party of Allah are they
that shall be triumphant.
Introduction
For the last 300 years the western world has separated religion and politics as
a common practice; however, this is not the case in Islam. In Muslim regions,
religion and politics are interwoven. Political institutions are designed to defend and
promote Islam, not the state, which inevitably clashes with the west and their style of
modernization and secularization [Husain, 1995].
What the Muslim world sees when modernization happens is a departure from
religious doctrine in government, as well as a severe injustice in economic
distribution, which is what fuels Islamic social movements [Husain, 1995]. The
basic premise is to remarry religious beliefs with the way in which people are
governed with religious beliefs determined and interpreted by religious leaders, of
course.
For more than 20 years Hizb'allah, translated as the Party of God, has played a
significant role in the history of Lebanon's Civil War, as well as their post war
reconstruction efforts. An Islamic movement whose seeds were first planted during
the chaos of a small country torn apart by Civil War has been able to adapt itself and
thrive within the changing climate of the region. Hizb'allah reached its height of
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power in the late 1980's when it gained political and military control over most of
West Beirut and large areas ofSouth Lebanon [Rubin, 2003]. What is interesting
about Hizb'allah is its ability to thrive when other similar militant groups coming out
ofthe same time dissipated. During the forming ofthe Ta'ifAgreement that finally
ended the Civil War, Hizb'allah was the only para-military group that was not
disbanded [Zisser, 1997]. Hizb' allah managed not only to establish themselves as a
well organized and diverse social movement during the Civil War, but managed to
reinvent themselves and establish themselves as a viable and legitimate force in
Lebanon's political structure.
This chapter will discuss three different subjects regarding Hizb'allah. First,
Hizb'allah's history and how this Islamic movement established itselfin the Lebanese
structure will be outlined. Second, I will discuss Hizb'allah's fundamental beliefs,
both spiritual and political, including the spiritual guidance oftheir charismatic leader
Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. Finally, this chapter looks at how Hizb'allah
plays an active role in the Lebanese political structure today. It is at the core ofthis
transition from para-military social movement to Lebanese political party that is of
great interest, in order to understand how Hizb'allah went from bombing 'western'
installations and kidnappings to services provider and political machine.

Historical Ties to Iraq
The genesis ofHizb'allah goes back before its official entrance into the
Lebanese theater in June 1982. Hizb'allah's leaders originated in the religious
academies ofthe southern city ofNajaf, Iraq, in the 1960's and 1970's. [Rainstorp,
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1997]. Many of the Shi'a religious leaders in Lebanon, including Fadlallah, had been
. and Kabala, Iraq. The Ba'ath regime in Iraq, a
educated in the holy cities ofNajaf

Sunni Muslim group, worked towards removing many of the Shi'a leaders in these
cities, inevitably resulting in many of them migrating to Lebanon. Some of these
religious leaders fled Iraq and formed the Lebanese al Dawa party. This party
empowered young Shi'a students to pursue political and economic growth for their
people. This party, under the spiritual guidance of Fadlallah, would later become a
key component of the establishment ofHizb'allah. In some ways, if it were not for
the problems in Iraq and the spiritual leaders' subsequent exodus to Lebanon, there
would not have been a Hizb'allah.
These clerics established educational institutions in Lebanon that based their
religious leadership on the Najaf model. The Najaf model was simple; follow in the
path of the Shi' a clerics to establish a stronger political and economic structure for the
Shi'a Muslims, the model that was followed in Tehran during the Iranian Revolution.
This new generation of Lebanese students was learning radical Islamic theory and
was soon given the challenge of bringing the Shi'a religion new political power and
prestige, not always through peaceful means. With the Iranian Revolution in 1979,
many Shi'a religious leaders saw the potential for Lebanon to be the next country to
enjoy a Shi'a Muslim republic. With the inspiration of Iran, the Ayatollah
Khoemeni's rise to power, and the Shi'a population being the fastest growing
communal group in Lebanon, the Shi'a would soon be establishing themselves as a
force wanting more political power. The Shi'a were certainly gaining strength in
numbers, and began organizing themselves and their communities into political
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activism. Whereas the Iranian revolution achieved its goals primarily by non-violent
means [Gelles, 1999], not all of the Shi'a groups in Lebanon, including Hizb'allah,
would follow that pattern.

War-Time Movements
Traditionally, the Shi'a community in Lebanon was the communal group that
was passive, economically impoverished and politically weak. During the war
several small groups of Shi'a emerged whose main objective was to organize the
people in order to gain political strength and to spread the idea of Arab nationalism
and strong opposition to a secular government in Lebanon. Lebanese nationalism as
an identity and loyalty to Lebanon as an independent nation were being replaced by a
resurgence of strong ties to religion [Hunter, 1988]. These groups wanted an Islamic
republic based on Islamic laws. Some of these groups were the Lebanese al-Dawa
[Fadlallah's group], Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon, Islamic Amal, Husain
Suicide Squad and the Association of Muslim Students, all of which eventually
contributed members into Hizb'allah [Hunter, 1988 and Rainstorp, 1997]. Another
group, the Amal movement, headed by Imam Musa al-Sadr, became pivotal in
Hizb'allah's eventual creation and success. In concert with these movements there
were three major events that propelled the Lebanese Shi'a from the traditionally
submissive role into one that sought an active, even radical, place in Lebanese
politics.
The first event was the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in 1978.
There was speculation that Libya's President Qadhdafi had a hand in his presumed
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assassination [Norton, 1987]. The second was the invasion of southern Lebanon by
the Israeli's in 1978 [and again in 1982], and the third was the establishment of a
Shi'a Islamic republic in Iran. These last two events not only gave the Shi'a
community a common enemy to fight, but gave them the political model they needed
to realize that being assertive politically was the way to achieve great things.
Throughout this time there were several movements that attempted to organize
a strong activism spirit within the Shi'a community, but there was something lacking.

..
It was difficult to organize fully; making themselves known to the community was
difficult as most of these groups were very secretive in nature. There were also
problems with the ability of these movements to provide services among the Shi'a
population that would help them gain support and membership, which was vital to the
success of the movements.
Hizb'allah's main 'competition' for political clout was the Amal movement,
which was led by Nabih Berri after the disappearance of al-Sadr, and was more
moderate than the other Shi'a groups. Berri still leads this organization and is the
Shi'a top political leader in Lebanon's Parliament, the equivalent of our Speaker of
the House. The more radical Shi'a leaders, both in Lebanon and Iran, felt that there
should be a more 'revolutionary' spirit within the Shi'a community, so they made a
plan for many al-Dawa members [the group that Fadlallah established earlier] to join
the Amal movement, creating a separation within the group. As more al-Dawa
members joined and gained influence within Amal there was a great split, as had been
predicted, between the more moderate group led by Nabih Berri and the more radical
side. This split became increasingly clear when Israel invaded the south of Lebanon
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in 1982. The moderates did not want to fight with Israel. As a matter of fact Berri,
representing Amal, signed a deal with the Christian government to deal with Israel
peacefully as part of the nation [Rainstorp, 1997]. This did not set well with the more
radical side of Amal. The invasion of South Lebanon prompted more desperation and
demand for action among the Shi'a community, primarily because they were the
communities that were being affected most by the loss of homes, businesses and life
[Hunter, 1988]. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, with the support of Iran, felt it was time to
leave Amal and create a group determined to end the Israel's occupation.

The Formation o(Hizb'allah
When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Iran convinced Syria to allow a small
special group of Iranian guards and religious leaders, or Pasdaran, to enter Lebanon
and help to create a stronger political movement among the Shi'a community. Prior
requests had been made by Iran, and all had subsequently been denied, since Syria did
not want any more problems added to what was already a huge mess in this small
country. But with the invasion oflsrael, and this time a much more intense
occupation occurring than before, Syria decided it was time to allow the Iranian
Pasdaran into the country to help defeat their common enemy. The Pasdaran
consisted of both military trainers sent to train the Lebanese to fight the Israeli's and
the West and religious leaders to indoctrinate the Lebanese clerics on creating an
Islamic Republic.
With the importation of the Iranian contingent came the importation of Iranian
money, something that was desperately scarce in war torn Lebanon, especially among
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the Shi'a community in the south. With this money Hizb'allah was able to provide
many needed services to the communities such as medical help, education, food, and
cash subsidies for the poor. Not only did they supply the region with immediate care,
they offered many young men jobs to join the movement and fight. Hizb'allah was
able to pay their warriors more than the Lebanese Army and certainly more than the
other movements, and their families were given free religious education, food and
medical care. Hizb'allah established several health care centers, primarily under the
title of Islamic Health Care Society, which eventually included 46 centers throughout
the country including several hospitals [Fecci, 1999]. The role of the Iranian bankroll
cannot be over stated.

All of this did not come without a price, however.

The Branches o(Hizb'allah are Established
The establishment ofHizb'allah happened simultaneously in three different
areas of Lebanon; the Biq'a Valley, Beirut, and the south of Lebanon. In the Biq'a
there were two leaders who became vitally important to the formation ofHizb'allah.
Sayyid Ahas al Musawi was originally one of the al-Dawa members who left al-Dawa
[Fadlallah's original group] to join the Amal movement to make the movement more
radically driven. When that failed and there was a split, al Musawi left and organized
his own Amal Islamya party, one that was approved by Iran. When Hizb'allah began
to emerge, Iran turned to al-Musawi to help lead in the cause. The other Biq'a leader,
Sheikh Subbi al-Tufayli, was another cleric leader who was trained in Najaf. These
two clerics not only established Hizb'allah in the Biq'a, but also imposed, with the
aid of the Iranian Pasdaran, Islamic fundamentalism on the people of the area through
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enforcement oflslamic dress and the banishment of 'western behavior'. Ifthey did
not comply with the laws imposed by Hizb'allah, the movement would use coercion
through harassment or even kidnapping [Rainstorp, 1997].
In Beirut, Fadlallah was the leader ofHizb'allah. Fadlallah arrived in Beirut
in 1966, establishing himselfin the suburbs ofBeirut as a spiritual leader and writer,
creating a large following ofyoung Shi'a. He had through the years been associated
with several ofthe movements listed above, but it was not until he became the
spiritual leader ofHizb'allah that really anyone in the West knew his name. His
reputation and popularity among the young energetic Shi'a community had as much
to do with his charitable work with the poor as it did with his writings advocating
political activism and force as a means to preserve and defend Islam. The Beirut
branch ofHizb'allah became a much more infamous group after the bombings in
1983 ofthe US Marine barracks and the US Embassy [Rainstorp, 1997].

The Event that Shocked the World
To this day no one exactly knows the exact identity ofthe suicide bombers
who drove into the marine barracks, but the speculation, innuendo and Hizb'allah's
public support ofthese events made Hizb'allah the prime suspect and the most likely
group to have committed these acts. They certainly had the money for the amount of
firepower needed to blast these installations. The blast ofthe military barracks in
October 1983 was the strongest non-nuclear explosion in history [Friedman, 1989].
Their public support ofthis attack also made Hizb'allah a model for the fight against
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foreign occupation, a cause that has been the main focus for Hizb'allah for the last 20
years.
The para-military section of Hizb'allah, the Islamic Resistance, was key to the
fight against Israel, and took a little longer to establish. The delay was due in part to
the fact that the Israeli soldiers' presence made it more difficulty to rally the
communities, but also this is where Amal had been strongest influence. As the Israeli
occupation continued people began to look for a remedy to remove Israel, and Amal
was not doing the job. Sheikh Rageb Harb, along with a small number of other more
radical clergy, set out to rid the southern landscape of Israelis. In 1984 Harb was
assassinated, most speculate by the Israelis, which only strengthened the membership
and mission of Hizb'allah in the south.
Throughout the 1980's and 1990's up through 2000 when Israel finally left all
but the Shebba Farms in the hills on the south Lebanese border, Lebanon was very
committed to the removal of Israeli forces, and committed to helping Hizb'allah
achieve that goal.

When the war ended in 1989, all para-military groups were to be

disbanded except for Hizb'allah, primarily because of the fight with Israel [Zisser,
1999].
Hizb'allah's rapid growth and popularity did not come accidentally. Though
no official membership list has ever existed [Hunter, 1988], the group grew larger and
stronger. Throughout the 1980's Hizb'allah was actively working towards building
its reputation and membership. Hizb'allah provided assistance for all the basic needs
of citizens, providing a stable infrastructure with the financial support of Iran. With
the financial backing oflran, Hizb'allah was able to work on their public personae
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and spread their message to a broader audience. They also gained legitimacy within
the Lebanese communities they were assisting. They established their own television
station [al-Manar], their own radio station [Voice ofthe Oppressed] and their own
newspaper [al-Ahd]. Their message was quite simple: the expulsion ofthe enemy of
Islam from Lebanon [that meant Israel and the United States] and the creation ofan
Islamic republic in Lebanon. With the eventual success ofexpelling the Israeli troops
into a thin strip ofland along the boarder, Hizb'allah gained respect and notoriety.
Israel finally did leave Lebanon in the May of2000 after nearly 20 years ofenduring
guerilla attacks and mortar bombs by Hizb'allah, and Hizb'allah was right here to
take the credit for Israel's 'retreat'.
A country tom by crisis and chaos certainly is vulnerable for movements such
as Hizb'allah. There were all sorts ofsocial movements happening throughout
Lebanon during the war, and they were moderately successful because ofthe
desperation and alienation felt by the Lebanese people. Three separate factors gave
Hizb'allah its strength and longevity. The first is resources, meaning Iranian support,
both in the form ofmoney and in Pasdaran. The social programs and the guerilla
warfare could not have been achieved without some serious cash backing them.
Secondly, Hizb'allah's social welfare programs generated public support.

The

Lebanese government, tom apart by Civil War, was unable to provide the basic
necessities to their population, and that is where Hizb'allah really was able to win the
support ofthe people. They built hospitals, pharmacies, and schools and provided
the desperately impoverished Shi'a community with food and essential needs. Third,
their tenacious attitude towards eliminating Israel as an occupying force in Lebanon,
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being somewhat successful early on in the invasion and the continuous assaults, gave
Hizb'allah legitimacy amongst its following. Even though the occupation lasted
another 18 years, this became the platform by which Hizb'allah was able to maintain
its popularity.

Hizb'allah 's War-Time Reputation
The United States originally saw Hizb'allah as more of an extension oflran
than anything Lebanese. At first, neither the United States nor Israel took this
movement too seriously, considering the traditional role that the Shi'a had played in
Lebanon. However, this underestimation would soon be changed.
Hizb'allah burst onto the Lebanese landscape with the idea of creating an
Islamic state, and with a series of violent acts. [Zisser, 1997] Numerous attacks by
the militant group towards the interests of the West and Israel left hundreds dead, and
put the name Hizb'allah on the United States' list of terrorist groups. By many
speculations, Hizb'allah has been linked to the bombings of the United States
Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and again in September 1984, theTWA flight 847
hijacking at the Beirut Airport which left a US Navy pilot dead and thrown out of the
plane onto the Beirut Airport tarmac, the car bombing of the US Marine barracks and
MNF headquarters killing 241 American military and 57 others, the kidnappings of
Terry Anderson and Colonial William Higgins [Davidson, 1998] and several deadly
attacks towards Israel.
It should be stressed, however, that during the Civil War, many militant
groups on 'every' side of the turmoil were responsible for many lives being lost. The
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Civil War broke out on April 13, 1975 when gunmen, thought to be PLO members,
killed four Phalangists in an attempt to assassinate President Jumayyil. Later that
day, the Phalangist opened fire on a busload of Palestinian passengers, killing 26.
[The Phalangist Party, a Christian militia group, was responsible for two Palestinian
refugee camps in Beirut full of woman and children being massacred] [Friedman,
1989]. The Civil War had many groups fighting against each other; there were not
just two sides. What made Hizb'allah unique were a couple of things. First, their
movement focused on foreign targets, primarily the United States and Israel, instead
of fighting within the domestic parameters; second they transformed themselves after
the war into a more legitimately recognized political party, at least within Lebanon.

Hizb'allah 's Post-War Role
As stated above, Hizb'allah's war role really had little to do with internal
strife in Lebanon [apart from their social programs], but rather with the external
forces oflsrael and the West, primarily the US. The US intervention triggered more
hostility towards the west because of the United States' support oflsrael [Hunter,
1988].
The end of the war in 1989 left Hizb'allah with the reputation for providing all
these wonderful social services to people when the government could not provide
them, which allowed their popularity to grow, bringing them to the forefront of the
political stage. When the first elections occurred after the war, Hizb'allah was able
to place key members into parliamentary elections, and they were successful. In 1992
Hizb'allah managed to earn 12 seats out of 128 parliament members. Throughout the
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1990' s they maintained at least 8 seats in every election; however, no Hizb'allah
member has ever held the highest Shi'a position in Parliament. That position has
been given to Nabih Berri, the Amal leader. Today there are 10 members in
Parliament who are Hizb'allah members, working to establish themselves as
moderates but being on the left regarding social issues. [Rainstorp, 1997].
Aside from the political arena, Hizb'allah also had unfinished business:
removing Israel from the landscape. The end of the war did not bring the end to
Israeli occupation, and their goal was still very clear: remove foreign occupation
forces by any means necessary. Throughout the 1990's the para-military branch of
.,.
Hizb' allah carried out several
guerilla attacks again Israeli troops in the south of

Lebanon, to the point that they became a serious threat to the lives of the Israeli
military stationed there. In May 2000 when Israel left the south of Lebanon, much to
the credit for the 'retreat' given to Hizb'allah.
Hizb'allah still carries fundamental ideologies that are clearly and uniquely
Hizb'allah, characterized by the ties with Iran. Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic premise is
one of those characteristics. The pan-Islamic belief has always been a way to liberate

. . The
Jerusalem, and one way to achieve that is by military aggression towards Israel.
establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon has been another key goal for
Hizb'allah, although throughout the years of political maneuvering it has become
clear that this is no longer the highest priority, much to the dismay of Iran. As a
matter of fact, Iran has withdrawn its funding of Hizb'allah based on this goal being
dropped from Hizb'allah's agenda.
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In order to play in the political arena in Lebanon, Hizb'allah has learned how
to work with their political adversaries to achieve their goals and gain more
legitimacy in the mainstream Lebanese society. In recent years they have welcomed
the cooperation between the Christians and the Shi'a, basically letting the country
know that they value the participation of the Christians, even the Maronite Presidents,
especially the current President Lahhoud with whom Fadlallah has worked closely
throughout the post war era.
Today Hizb'allah is considered in Lebanon a viable force in the political
arena. They still do, however, have their militant groups who continue working
towards the removal oflsrael form the Shebba Farms along the boarder oflsrael and
Syria. Throughout Hizb'allah's existence they have taken a large share of their
guidance and ideology from very charismatic leaders, primarily their spiritual leader,
Sheikh Fadlallah.

Fadlallah 's Role
Sheikh Fadlallah has been the spiritual leader of Hizb'allah since its inception
in 1982. Sheikh Fadlallah, an Iraqi born cleric and proclaimed descendant of the
Prophet Mohammad, received a classical Islamic education in the seminaries of
Najaf, Iraq, then moved to Lebanon in 1966 and earned his place as one of the most
influential leaders in recent Lebanese history [Rainstorp, 1997].
F adlallah's speeches have changed over the course of Hizb' allah's existence,
whether due to the climate of the day, or to the reader. He has denounced violence,
yet he refers to suicide bombers as martyrs. He has stated that one of his goals has
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been to create an Islamic republic, yet he believes that now it would be
counterproductive to pursue the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon. He believes
that the Lebanese have a freedom of religion that other Arab countries do not enjoy,
and they should use that instead of pursuing an Islamic republic through any type of
revolutionary method. "The heavens won't fall if the Lebanon choose to change it
[their political system]. But for the moment, believers should concentrate on using
Lebanon's freedoms of speech and political action to promote Islam, for Islam can
best be conveyed to the West and to the region through Lebanon" [Miller 1994].
It is rather difficult to find any definitive stand he takes on any issue, since
most of what he has stated can be refuted in other places. Fadlallah himself is a very
good political machine, catering to the needs of the moment, but also having the
ability to be a charismatic leader whose success or failure is not limited to what he
says, but how he is able to inspire other people. This flexibility of motivations and
goals has aided Hizb'allah in its survival and success in the Lebanese political
landscape.

Conclusion
Hizb'allah continues to be a strong political force in Lebanon as well as a
complex institution. Its ability to adapt to the political, economic and global climate
has made its longevity possible. This is not all dore by one entity or for that matter
by one person. The condition of Lebanon at the time ofHizb'allah's entrance into the
landscape provided this movement with opportunity unparalleled to any other. With
the financial backing of Iran, Hizb'allah was able to pursue more challenging
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objectives, and achieve them, or at least all but one. Lebanon is still a democracy, yet
structured on communal representation, and Hizb'allah realizes that it is not changing
anytime soon. This realization has brought them to a more mainstream approach of
cooperation within the government rather than combativeness.
Now that Israeli troops are out of the south of Lebanon and there is talk about
a Palestinian state, the future ofHizb'allah is rather undetermined. If liberating
Jerusalem is no longer an issue, the Israelis are gone from the south, and they have
conceded to a religiously diverse government, what fights will the Party of God take
on in the future? It will be interesting to follow. For now, however, Hizb'allah has
secured its place in the Lebanese landscape for years to come.
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Chapter5
Analyzing Hizb'allah as a Social Movement
Hizb'allah has been called many things since its inception in 1982, ranging
from terrorist group to the saviors of the south of Lebanon. But does Hizb'allah fit
the theoretical criteria for a Social Movement? This chapter will explore this
question taking a step-by-step approach to applying the theoretical concept from
Chapter 2 to the history of Hizb'allah.
In doing this analysis, we will be taking a chronological or historical view of
the conditions that were present prior to the creation of Hizb'allah, the birth of this
movement, and how it managed to continue after its creation. This will allow a
holistic picture will appear. There is no definitive blueprint for Social Movements;
each one is unique. However, by applying these critical features that seem to be
prevalent both in theory and practice, perhaps some generalities will emerge that will
at least provide an understanding of the environment that is open for Social
Movements to emerge.
Although this chapter labels Hizb'allah as a Social Movement, the more
interesting question will be addressed in the final chapter: why is it important to
understand all this?

Type o(Social Movement
In first looking at Hizb'allah as a Social Movement, let us establish into which
category of Social Movement Hizb' allah falls? In Vago [ 1989] and Chapter 2, we
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identified five different types of Social Movements; Reactionary, Reform,
Expressive, Resistant and Revolutionary. By Vago's definitions, Hizb'allah could
actually be classified as two of these types. First, as a Resistant Movement
Hizb'allah did not just seek to change the way in which the West and Israel were able
to establish themselves as leading groups within Lebanon. Hizb'allah also worked
diligently to fight the current social structure that included the West and Israel and
remove them as entities in Lebanon. Second, Hizb'allah certainly falls into the
Revolutionary Movement category that Vago [1989] describes. Hizb'allah not only
committed themselves to removing the current social structure in Lebanon, but
replacing it by turning Lebanon into an Islamic State patterned after Iran [Rainstorp,
1997].

Theoretical Elements vs. Hizb'allah
In the chronological approach taken in Chapter Two, Social Movements were
defined in three simple stages: the preconditions that led to Social Movements, the
creation of a Social Movement, and the continuation of a Social Movement, or what
is needed to ensure its survival. All of these stages have certain conditions that are
present when looking historically at a Social Movement, and in the course of this
analysis these theoretical conditions will blossom into concrete historical
applications.
What types of conditions are present, both in society and in individuals, prior
to the creation of a Social Movement? Even though these conditions are present, are
they essential in producing a cause/effect in the creation of a Social Movement, or do

67

these conditions simply produce a likely environment that is conducive to collective
action and organization of people? This question is certainly basic; however, what
must be understood is that these conditions have been present throughout history and
in many societies, and Social Movements did not always appear.

Breakdown in Society
In an attempt to understand the nature of the environment in which Social
Movements develop, first we look to the condition of the societal structure.
Kornhauser [1959] and Smelser [1963] both focus on how the conditions of the
society play a pivotal role in setting the stage for Social Movements to emerge.
Kornhauser [1959] and Smelser [1963] discuss the breakdown in society and how this
affects the way in which people feel.
In the case of the emergence of Hizb'allah, the society from which Hizb'allah
emerged was in extreme disarray. A Civil War had ripped apart a nation in which
decades of fragility plagued every societal structure. Since Lebanon's independence
in 1943 there had been several outbreaks of violence between various groups, and in
1958 Lebanon had even entered into what could be called a prelude to the 1975 War
[Haddad, 1985]. The violence in 1975 broke apart any structure that was established
in the Lebanese government.
Lebanon has had para-military groups and social movements since its
independence; the Civil War only encouraged and legitimized these movements and
the creation of new ones. These groups were established primarily along communal,
or religious, lines, and the Shi'a groups were no different.
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From the onset of the war in 1975 to the establishment of Hizb' allah in 1982,
the Lebanese social, political and economic structure was completely destroyed. The
Lebanese Army broke apart, with many leaving the military to join various militias
that represented their own communal ties. National security was non-existent, and
cities were quartered off and patrolled by self-appointed gunmen. The Lebanese
people became more alienated everyday from their national identity and replaced that
identity with their own communal or ethnic groups. The economy had collapsed and
people were desperate to sustain their families; no help was coming from the
Lebanese government agencies.
Hizb'allah was created from this society of war and disorganization. As small
groups began developing, they polarized people away from their national identity and
the ties to their communal groups only grew stronger. These grassroots movements
quickly grew to political movements, and the most successful of these movements
were the ones that appealed to confessional identity [Norton, 1987]. Identification by
communal roots is historical in Lebanon, and the war only intensified this identity
[Gordon, 1983]. Religious affiliation was the single most important identity among
the Lebanese [Haddad, 1985] and the Shi'a were not exempt from this.
Although Kornhauser [1959] and Smelser [1963] establish the condition of
society as a factor in the establishment of a social movement, their theories fail to
explain how, especially under societal breakdown, people are able to organize a
functional movement, or why people tend to follow the lead of others. If there is
disorganization in society, how do people distinguish between groups of activists?
They also do not explain how, when there is a complete breakdown in society, people
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are able to mobilize with money and materials. Finally, it does not explain how,
when societal structures disappear, social movements do not always appear. It is not
a guarantee that when there is a breakdown in society people will mobilize and form
movements.

Politically Weak and Powerless
The Shi'a in Lebanon, historically, have been the poorest of the
communal/ethnic groups, but also the fastest growing group since Lebanon's
independence [Norton, 1987]. Shi'a have the highest rates of illiteracy, poverty and
have the least amount of political clout in Lebanese politics [Gordon, 1983]. When
the war erupted in 1975, and throughout the progression of violence, the Shi'a, as a
group, were the most affected by the lack of social programs that provided food and
services to the poor. For the Shi'a regions in the south the loss of homes and property
as a result of the south being used as a battlefield between the Palestinians and Israeli
Army was paramount to their desperate struggle for survival.
Though the population of the Shi'a grew, their political power did not. This
created great dissatisfaction among the Shi'a, so when these movements began
emerging, this was a way in which the voice of the Shi'a could be heard. When
Hizb'allah emerged in 1982, the plight of the Shi'a had worsened; Hizb'allah offered
assistance to the poor, as well as more aggressive methods to gain political strength
[Rainstorp, 1997].
The weakness in this theory is that simply because a group tends to feel
politically weak and powerless, this does not ensure that organizing a movement will
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bring about this power and political strength that the members seek. For instance,
Hizb'allah, though this movement has made some progress with attaining political
power in Lebanon, has not gained the political power and strength that the Shi'a
hoped to achieve given that they are the majority group within Lebanon. The Shi'a
are still the poorest and have the highest illiteracy rate in Lebanon today [Norton,
1987].

Lack ofSocial Ties
Mass Society Theory posits that the lack of social ties causes people to seek
out others [Kornhauser, 1959].

This aspect is significant to the creation of all of the

Lebanese Social Movements that were established during the war years; however, the
Lebanese did not suffer from complete alienation, but primarily alienation from their
government. The social ties that are relevant are the ties the Lebanese people had
with their government and with other Lebanese, however weak they may have been.
Citizens of Lebanon were alienated from their government, since the government was
in complete disarray caused by Civil War. People who attempted to connect with
their government, whether for social services, or for security of their home and
persons, were left on their own to solve their problem. Alienation felt by individuals
seeking relief from the government became stronger as the government became more
and more fragmented as the war raged on, and eventually the government became no
more tangible than the clouds in the air. People suffering from bombed out houses or
lack of food or medical supplies became more desperate for help, and felt as though
their government did not care about their plight. Cohesion to national identity had
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always been superceded by religious affiliation in Lebanese culture [Haddad, 1985],
so people's ties to their individual groups only became stronger once the ties to the
nation were severed by war.
By the time Hizb'allah was established in 1982, the ties that bonded these
members together had been cultivated within the Shi'a community for years.
Hizb'allah was not organized from a traditional origin, but rather was a
conglomeration of smaller, already established movements [Hunter, 1988].
Hizb'allah's very creation was possible because of the strong membership in these
smaller groups.
Again Kornhauser's [1959] argument stipulates that people who lack social
ties seek out others to establish movements. Though possibly feeling alienated from
their government, the Lebanese people have stronger ties to their families,
communities and communal ties that not only stayed intact, but grew stronger
throughout the war years. This argument also does not explain why social
movements did not evolve in other areas and periods of history where alienation and
lack of social ties were far greater than in Lebanon in the late 20th Century.

Relatively Deprived
For several years prior to the birth of Hizb'allah, Shi'a leaders had focused
their message to their followers on the plight of the Shi'a communities. The Shi'a
were, no doubt, very hard hit by the affects of the war; they did not need their
religious leaders to tell them this. The leaders also focused their attention on the
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economic and political struggles that the Shi'a were experiencing, which were
comparatively much worse than the other Lebanese groups.
Though relative deprivation is important in understanding people's
resentment, it does not give a rationale for the targets of these movements. For
example, Hizb'allah was a Shi'a based movement. The Shi'a could look around
within Lebanon at the Christians, Druze and the Sunni Muslims to see that the Shi'a
population was by far suffering the most, but none of the Shi'a groups targeted the
other Lebanese groups. Instead, they focused their target on the West and Israel.
Their ideology did not include comparisons between what the West or Israel had, or
their quality of life, but rather the fact that these targets had infiltrated Lebanon.
Hizb'allah was not established because the Shi'a were comparing themselves to
others and realized what they were lacking; they were established for very distinct
purposes of driving out foreign occupiers and establishing an Islamic state [Rainstorp,
1997].

Who is to Blame for the Shi'a Plight?
It would have been very difficult for the Shi'a leaders to convince the
communities that the Shi'a were the only ones who suffered in the war, since all the
Lebanese people were affected. Hizb'allah used the plight and suffering of the Shi'a
people to promote their agenda of animosity towards Israel and the West, primarily
the United States. This target of blame was not unbelievable to the Shi'a, especially
those living in the South were Israeli bombs were hitting their villages in retaliation
for Palestinian bombings into Israel. Between the bombing that destroyed villages
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and loss of innocent lives, the Shia's became more radicalized and created the images
that were used to convince the Shi'a about who was truly to blame for their troubles
[Hunter, 1988].
The United States became a target of blame by Hizb'allah primarily because
of its support oflsrael. Using Israel and the United States as the source of Shi'a
problems benefited Hizb'allah, and that blame escalated simultaneously with their
creation. The hatred of the west and Israel became so important to the platform of
Hizb'allah that Hizb'allah's manifesto clearly established their beliefs and intentions
towards their self-declared enemy:
"We have opted for religion, freedom and
dignity over humiliation and constant submission to
America and its allies and Zionism...we have risen to
liberate our country, to drive the imperialists and
invaders out of it [Lebanon] and to take fate into our
own hands." [Davidson, 1998].

Charismatic Leadership
The leadership among the Shi'a was very strong and determined to mobilize
people for activism. During the Civil War the common place was to organize or
belong to a social movement, and since the basic identity the Lebanese citizen
became membership in these groups was their communal affiliation, these groups
began emerging from the Churches and the Mosques throughout Lebanon, including
Hizb'allah. Hizb'allah's origins began inside the Mosques in the suburbs of Beirut,
the Biq'a Valley, and in the South of Lebanon [Rainstorp, 1997].
Fadlallah found his following in the slums of Beirut [Rainstorp, 1997].
Fadlallah began his religious education in Najaf, Iraq and moved to Beirut in the mid
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1960' s where he began working with underprivileged Shi'a youth through social
programs. Over the years he gained a large following through his writings and his
religious sermons [Rainstorp, 1997].
When the war began Fadlallah organized the Family of Brotherhood in the
suburbs of Beirut [Zisser, 1997]. Once Fadlallah's group joined with the other
movements to form Hizb'allah, Fadlallah became the movement's spiritual leader
[Rainstorp, 1997].
Though the title 'spiritual leader' may seem rather ambiguous, with both
duties and responsibilities to the movement or the movement's behavior, Fadlallah as
spiritual leader guided Hizb'allah's ideology and mission. He has inspired many
young Shi'a to join Hizb'allah through his teachings
and writings, and through the
"
years refined the movement's goals to best suit Hizb'allah's longevity and political
success [Zisser, 1997; Miller, 1994].
Although charismatic leadership is important, it cannot explain how
movements are able to continue and prosper after the departure of such leadership. If
organizations that continue for as many years, like Hizb'allah, there are many leaders
who enter and leave throughout the movement's lifetime. Chances are that
Hizb'allah will continue long after the departure ofNasrallah or Fadlallah. Granted,
to help establish these movements you need strong leadership to establish them, but
most long lasting movements are not about the work of one individual who is the
epitome of this movement, but rather a conglomeration of many.
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Political Opportunity
The Civil War fragmented the Lebanese government, which in many ways
opened the gates of opportunity for grass roots movements to vie for political
positions and power. There was no governmental control limiting these movements,
so they were able to mobilize political agendas freely without governmental
intervention, and Hizb'allah was not any different.
Lebanese people also became more aware of the politics in Lebanon, and took
more of an active interest in what was happening within the Parliament walls. There
were a wide variety of political organizations that competed for membership, and the
movements that had the most success appealed to their confessional identity [Norton,
1987].
Hizb'allah offered the Shi'a a social movement that was an alternative to the
more mainstream Amal Movement, which is still a strong political party today.
Amal's major difference from Hizb'allah was that Hizb'allah took an aggressive
militant stand against Israel and the West, and Amal did not. Hizb'allah's aggression
towards Israel seemed to be free from governmental control. In fact, after the 1989
Taif Accord, all the militias in Lebanon were ordered to surrender their weaponry
except for Hizb'allah's guerilla fighters in the south, who were to fight the Israelis
until their retreat from southern Lebanon [Rainstorp, 1997].

Organized Movement?
Hizb'allah's creation, as discussed earlier, came from absorbing other, already
established movements: Al'dawa, Islamic Amal, Husain Suicide Squad, and the
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Family of Brotherhood [Davidson, 1998]. These movements already had a level of
organization and hierarchical structure, so when Hizb'allah was born in June 1982,
these structures were already established. Once Hizb'allah began to operate, it
created different cells within the organization to handle different aspects of the
movement. There was a cell that provided social services [food, medicine, medical
help, etc.], a military branch that operated guerilla warfare and was responsible for
many devastating events that took place through the 1980's, and a political group that
worked towards gaining Parliamentary seats [Rainstorp, 1997].
According to Davidson [1998], Hizb'allah has never become truly centralized
like other movements. There are different chapters within Hizb'allah that work
independently of each other to sustain the entire movement.

However, Hizb'allah is

overseen by a small group of Shi'a clerics who provide counseling to the various
chapters and maintain the strong ideology that it has established [Rainstorp, 1997].

Ideology
Hizb'allah's ideology from the very beginning left no question whatsoever as
to what they believed, what they intended to do, and to what degree they would act in ·
order to achieve their goals. There was no question as to the tactics Hizb'allah was
willing to use as well. Their agenda included the waging of Jihad, or holy war,
against the enemies of Islam. According to Hizb'allah, these enemies included Israel,
France, the United States, and their allies. They also included Lebanese Christian and
Sunni groups; however, Hizb'allah focused their actions against Israel and the West
[Davidson, 1998].
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The level of commitment Hizb'allah had to achieve for this holy war was also
made clear in their agenda, which included the acceptance of Martyrdom and self
sacrifice [Davidson, 1998]. Martyrdom and self-sacrifice are key factors when trying
to understand the ideology of Hizb'allah, or any other group that has established this
same level of commitment.

Sacrificing their life for what is believed to be a holy

mission is greatly respected within these groups. In the south of Lebanon and the
Islamic sections of Tripoli, Beirut, and the Biq'a Valley, there are pictures posted on
power line poles and store front windows of men who were considered martyrs and
sacrificed their lives to help further their cause.

Recruitment ofMembers and Resources
Within this element not only is it important to have charismatic leadership to
inspire the members, but these leaders also must have the ability to recruit new
members into the organization. Hizb'allah had success with this recruitment for
several reasons. Fist, Hizb'allah's communal identity, like other social movements in
Lebanon during this period, was vital in attracting memrers into the organization.
Second, Hizb'allah had plenty of money to provide services and opportunities to
communities that otherwise would have had nothing. However, communal ties,
social aid and Hizb'allah's ideology were not the only reasons that the Shi'a were
joining Hizb'allah.
Iran was the country that supported Hizb'allah, not only with money [which
surpassed tens of millions of dollars through the years] but also with religious and
military leaders, weaponry, and supplies. With this patronage Hizb'allah was able to
recruit members for their militias and pay them a higher wage than any of the other
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movements, and offer education, housing, medical assistance and food for the
militiamen's families [Zisser, 1997; Rainstorp, 1997].

Conclusion
It seemed a rather easy task to set aside these particular elements offered
within the theories and then retrospectively ask if Hizb'allah possessed these
characteristics. This analysis only proves that these factors are present to some
degree in the history of Hizb'allah. Each one of these factors, again, only explains
one aspect of the development of a movement; it does not holistically explain its
existence. There could be the same conditions and the same or similar events, but
there may never have been a social movement that was developed. In order to fully
establish a 'recipe' for these factors, and the degree to which they contribute to the
development and longevity of a social movement, more comparative studies are
necessary. Which ingredient of these is the critical element that gives birth to a
movement like Hizb'allah? Is it the environment from which it emerged, the
financial backing it received from Iran, or the culture within Lebanon to identify with
communal groups rather than by national identity? There are many reasons for
Hizb'allah's emergence and for their longevity. Would they still be holding any kind
of political power if they would not have fought with Israel until Israel's withdrawal
in 2000? Hizb'allah took every opportunity to claim Israel's withdrawal as their own
victory, and that credit they proclaimed has won them many votes within the country.
The reasons for Hizb'allah's transformation and continued success will be discussed
in the final chapter of this thesis.
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It would also be an easy solution to simply label Hizb'allah as an 'Islamic
movement', which in one sense would be correct, but then we would be missing the
bigger picture. There were also Christian movements that emerged throughout the
Civil War, and before the war. So if we were to only analyze Hizb'allah as an
Islamic movement, we would only be looking at their ideology, not at why they were
created in the first place. All social movements, whether they are Islamic, political,
racial or ethnic, or sexual identity in nature, emerge for basically the same reasons.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

In Chapter 2 the life-course ofa Social Movement is outlined according to
Vago [1989] in five steps: Incipiency, Coalescence, Institutionalization,
Fragmentation and Demise. In Chapter 5 there is no question that Hizb'allah can be
characterized as a Social Movement, and ifwe take Vago [1989] into consideration,
Hizb'allah has certainly reached the Institutional level. Chapter 5 worked through the
first three stages as they related to Hizb'allah, but there are two more levels of
consideration according to Vago [1989]. The question is not whether Hizb'allah can
be characterized as a social movement, but rather, will Hizb'allah follow the path to
eventual decline according to Vago?

It is certain that Hizb'allah has successfully

maintained their Institutionalization level for over 20 years. How has Hizb'allah been
able to not only avoid the next chapter ofthe life course, but been able to establish
itselfwithin the mainstream Lebanese political landscape? Today Hizb'allah holds
roughly 10% ofthe Lebanese Parliamentary seats, and that percentage has been held,
plus or minus a point or two, for the last 15 years. An argument could be made that,
once a Social Movement has reached the level ofInstitutionalization, the Movement
could somehow maintain itselfand not fall victim to Fragmentation and Demise.
What factors are needed for a Social Movement to maintain its longevity?
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Social Movement Organization
According to Zald and Ash [1959], once a social movement becomes
institutionalized, it becomes a Social Movement Organization. Once this
organizational structure emerges, there are three factors that help a social movement
survive: goal transformation, organizational maintenance, and oligarchization [Zald &
Ash, 1959].
Goal transformation becomes necessary if a social movement is going to not
only survive but grow. The original goals of a movement could have been
accomplished, or over time the Social Movement realizes that this goal is no longer
realistic. It is not necessarily that the goal cannot be achieved; it could mean that
continued labor towards accomplishing this goal is no longer in the Social
Movement's best interest. In the case ofHizb'allah, the movement did transform its
goals. Their original goals were to drive out Israel and the West, aid the Palestinians
in their freedom from occupation, and transform Lebanon into an Islamic State
modeled after their benefactor Iran [Zisser, 1997]. After eight years ofguerilla
warfare, whether influenced by the actions ofHizb'allah or through their own accord,
Israel did leave the south of Lebanon in May of 2000, and the US military presence
had ended several years prior to that. In the eyes ofHizb'allah, goal one had been
realized, and Hizb'allah wasted no time taking credit for Israel's 'retreat'. This claim
of victory was made well known to all the Lebanese citizens, and many Lebanese
began accepting Hizb'allah as a viable and respectable political force. The second
goal, the establishment of Lebanon as an Islamic state, became a goal that Hizb'allah
had determined would not be a goal that, if pursued, would be in the best interest of
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the longevity of the movement. Hizb'allah was receiving credit for Israel's
withdrawal from Lebanon, whether credit was deserved or not, and they were
receiving widespread legitimacy as a political entity. If they had pursued the Islamic
statehood, they would have lost much of their support. Hizb'allah's desire to be
accepted as a political group was more important to the group than establishing an
Islamic state, and this was the rationale for the change in their ideology. When goals
change, according to Zald and Ash [1959], they change towards the conservative side,
and that is certainly what Hizb'allah decided to do.
The second factor is organizational maintenance. Hizb'allah, throughout its
existence, has made extensive attempts to provide resources to their members, either
to ensure commitment or to recruit new members. Hizb'allah has provided many
social services to their members and their local communities, which has been key to
establishing political loyalty, while at the same time gaining the respect of other
Lebanese by providing humanitarian services to those in need. The maintenance of
members is secure.
Finally, oligarchization, or concentration of power, is the third factor.
Hizb'allah has survived, according to many observers, because of their ability to not
concentrate central power. There are many cells within Hizb'allah; however, all of
these chapters, though independent of one another, still observe the ideology set by a
small group oflslamic clerics, led by Fadlallah. Hizb'allah has groups that are
independent of one another, and that is one significant feature that has enabled
Hizb'allah to avoid decline. Hizb'allah has groups that are para-military, including
security groups that monitor various checkpoints throughout Lebanon, primarily in
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the South and Biq'a. Hizb'allah also has a huge organization dealing primarily with
social services to the poor. Medical treatment is offered through many of
Hizb'allah's hospital facilities throughout Lebanon, catering primarily to the poor
Shi'a groups. Another section of Hizb'allah is the political party, focusing their
attention on maintaining parliamentary seats in Beirut. Another group, more
notorious to Westemers and Israeli's, is the small contingent of guerilla fighters who
on occasion attack the borders oflsrael. Hizb'allah's ability to diversify their various
groups has aided in their ability to maintain themselves as a functioning social
organization.
Hughes [1999] also identifies factors that contribute to the Social Movement's
longevity. The first is a common ethnic background and/or language spoken by the
group's members. Hizb'allah members do possess this trait, since Hizb'allah was
founded and sustained by Lebanese Shi'a, with Iranian influence. The second factor
proposes that a spiritual hierarchy is essential and those in authoritative positions are
held to a higher moral status than other members. Hizb'allah's central thread has
been choreographed by Shi'a clerics who have laid the foundations for Hizb'allah's
ideological identity. Obligatory confessions of transgressions provide a movement
with social control over its members, and are the third factor offered by Hughes
[ 1999]. This factor is also one that Hizb'allah certainly possesses. During the early
years of establishment Hizb'allah enforced strict laws over those who resided in
Hizb'allah controlled communities [Rainstorp, 1997]. Not only were members of
Hizb' allah held to these standards, but any citizens who resided in these regions,
regardless of their communal ties were held to these same standards [Rainstorp,
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1997]. Finally Hughes [1999] posits that a social movement that sports uniforms or
special clothing strengthens the cohesion of the movement. Apart from strict Islamic
dress imposed on the women, some of the separate chapters ofHizb'allah do wear
uniforms, particularly the militia groups. Hizb'allah also has strong symbols that
have become recognizable as Hizb'allah. Their flags and banners are boldly shown in
their controlled regions. Certainly Hizb'allah has established these techniques that
strengthen the organizational level of their social movement. Perhaps that is why
they have been able to maintain their longevity.

Hizb'allah Today
By American and Israeli standards, Hizb'allah is still a terrorist organization
because of its use of violent tactics, its guerilla warfare against Israel in the south, and
its continued support of the Palestinian organizations that are in constant battle with
the Israeli government. Though Hizb'allah may not be an organization that every
Lebanese supports, certainly they do not see Hizb'allah as the threat that the West and
Israel sees.
Today this social movement is not only a viable political party, holding more
than 10% of the Lebanese Parliamentary seats; they also support charities, hospitals
and schools. Hizb'allah established Emdad Committee for Islamic Charity in 1987,
though Hizb'allah's social programs had been in place for years prior to Emdad's
inception. Emdad operates many programs, including health care, education,
employment training, social welfare, orphan and emergency relief [Emdad website].
Their 9 branches throughout Lebanon and 5 schools all support the underprivileged
Lebanese citizens, primarily the Shi'a population in the south of Lebanon.
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Apart from their social welfare and political branches, Hizb'allah continues to
maintain a small militia force, now primarily utilized as peacekeepers in villages
throughout the Biq'a and south of Lebanon.

Why Hizh 'al/ah?
Hizb'allah certainly is not a unique entity. Several Social Movements
emerged throughout Lebanon, not to mention throughout the world, and have
sustained themselves for long periods of time. What made Hizb'allah an interesting
case study was not the fact that Hizb'allah has not disintegrated, but how they have
transformed over the course of time and managed to emerge in legitimate Lebanese
society. From an era of bombings, guerrilla warfare, assassinations and political
kidnappings, Hizb'allah has taken this history and transformed their appearance into
mainstream Lebanese culture. Where once Hizb'allah sought the dawning of an
Islamic state modeled after their benefactor Iran, they now accept and actually
embrace other communal groups, stating in fact that the Christians are an important
factor in the success of Lebanon today [Zisser, 1997].

Personal Interest in Lebanon
My personal interest in Lebanon actually goes back to 1983 and the bombing
of the MNF barracks in October 1983. I was a freshman at Hope College, sheltered
from the fears and anxieties felt on the other side of the world. When the bombing
happened, the news coverage would show excerpts from Lebanon, primarily Beirut,
showing the destruction, reporting on the horrors that surrounded these journalists.
When I watched these news reports as a 17-year-old girl, all I saw was the beauty of
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this land. It made me wonder how in such an incredibly beautiful landscape there
could be so much fighting and chaos. Having been born and raised in Michigan, I
never was particularly pleased with my environment, always dreaming of some far
away land, walking along a warm coast of palm trees and translucent blue water. My
first paper I ever wrote regarding Lebanon was my reaction to the bombing and my
interpretation of the message the bombers were sending. This paper was written in
spring 1984 for an English class I was taking.
Over the course of the next few years I kept a passive interest in Lebanon. I
was always impressed by the charm and rich culture of this region that went back
thousands of years. By the time I was in graduate school in 1999 I had a good
Lebanese friend who shared some very gruesome experiences his family endured
living in Hamra [a suburb in West Beirut]. He truly inspired me to take on a subject
dealing with Lebanon for my graduate studies. When this paper began taking shape, I
realized this is where my interest, and my heart, truly lies. Now I have spent time in
the place I have studied and dreamed about for so many years, and with every fiber of
myself I can tell you the experience of Lebanon has surpassed all my expectations
and anticipations. I have walked along the sea in my dreams that is lined with palm
trees, seen historical places that I had only read about, stood on ground that only a
decade earlier had been under siege, and have seen the spirit of resilience in people
that make me grateful for everything I have ever had in my life. It is a very humbling
experience to touch buildings that have bullet holes in them, knowing that they were
in a path of a war. To think of how people took their children to school everyday
through military check points and gunfights is something that goes beyond most
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Americans' ability to understand. Sometimes it is necessary to see what pain others
have endured to appreciate your own life.
What is truly the most amazing part of Lebanon, though, is not the landscape
and beauty; it is by far the people that I know. The Lebanese people are truly
survivors, strong in spirit and gracious in a way that make you realize their concerns
and purpose in life go much deeper than surface ideals. They truly have a strong and
willful love of life, devoted to what they believe. When I would hear what these
families have gone through just trying to live their daily lives like we do here, it
amazes me they still can laugh, can love, and can have hope for a brighter future.

Future Research Topics
There are several scenarios for future study and research. Certainly this thesis
has raised enough questions and illustrated many gaps within social movement
research to keep this researcher busy for years to come.

Future Comparative Hizb'allah Study
Many different approaches to the study of Hizb'allah are also left to future
research. Comparative studies or Hizb'allah and other social movements are
ultimately endless in topic material. Considering the similarities and differences
between other social movements and Hizb'allah, both externally and internally, may
perhaps answer more definitively the question of the longevity of Hizb'allah
compared to other movements.
One comparative approach that would be very beneficial would be to look at
other Islamic Movements. This study would be a far more in depth analysis of the
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ideologies and cultures of the groups. This study oflslamic groups would have been
a very informative and instrumental study for this thesis; however, for considerations
of time and length, this should be one avenue of study that yields its own research.
Another comparative study should be done looking at the other Lebanese
political groups that originated during the same time period. What did Hizb'allah do
differently, or similarly, to these other movements? Looking at the ideologies and
actions ofHizb'allah in comparison to the other Lebanese groups may provide some
answers concerning the success ofHizb'allah.
One more comparative study would be to look at how Hizb'allah political
practices/ideology are similar to and different from other Lebanese politics. How
does Hizb'allah cooperate with other political groups, and who are their
allies/opposition in Parliament?

The Legacy o(Hizb'allah
One interesting topic to research would be to study the effects ofHizb'allah
and their social programs that benefited the Lebanese people, especially during the
war. How did Hizb'allah improve living conditions for the Lebanese, and what
effects is Hizb'allah still having on the quality of life for the Lebanese people?
Can we look at Hizb'allah as a catalyst or leader in the arena of aggressive
Revolutionary Movements? IfHizb'allah was able to establish legitimacy within
their country, can other social movements that are currently defined by their own
nation as 'terrorists' become legitimate movements? Does Hizb'allah and their
legitimacy have anything to do with the public personae they present regarding their
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ideas concerning the condition of Lebanon? Has their goal to transform Lebanon into
an Islamic state really been cast aside, or do they hold this agenda privately?

Islamic Movements
This thesis did not discuss the role oflslam in Hizb'allah, nor did it discuss
other Islamic movements. This is an important aspect to Hizb'allah, as it is with
other movements, primarily because the ideologies of these movements are derived
from the foundation of their religious beliefs. It is important to understand how
culture and religion work hand in hand in creating these movements. This was not
touched on in this thesis, but would be an interesting topic for further research.
This look into Islamic movements could segue into another research topic,
looking at present day Afghanistan and Iraq, including how Islamic groups are
forming in these regions after their occupations and resulting disarray. How is the
Islamic cleric Musa Al Sadr mobilizing his group in Najaf, Iraq in a militant stand
against the Coalition troops? All of these movements are being created now on the
threshold of uncertainty in these regions, somewhat like the uncertainty that prevailed
in Lebanon in the late 1970's and 1980's.
Another related topic, though it spans beyond the Islamic Movements, would
be to critically define 'terrorist'. As stated in chapter two, this was not a term that
was dealt with in depth here. An interesting project would be to deconstruct and
define 'terrorist' then apply that definition to many different groups throughout
history to determine who truly could be categorized as a terrorist or terrorist
organization.
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Lebanon
There are many research avenues this writer would like to travel when it
comes to Lebanon. After writing this thesis, there are more questions unanswered
and infinite possibilities for future writing.
One very interesting topic to this writer is the role of Syria in Lebanese
politics, and the inability of Lebanon's government to liberate itself from Syrian
control. The United Nations recently passed Resolution 1559 which outlines the need
for Syria to remove themselves from Lebanon. Taking a look at this Resolution over
time to see if it is actually enforced would be another interesting research topic.
Throughout history Lebanon has been victim to one hegemonic control or another;
what could this small country do to achieve complete independence from foreign
control? Since originally submitting this thesis, a tragic event took place in Beirut.
The assassination of Rafik Harriri on February 14, 2005 will certainly play a very
large role in the future of Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Since his death, there have
been demonstrations opposing the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and speculations have
been made Syria the primary suspect in the car bomb that took Mr. Harriri's life.
Whether or not Syria is to blame for this terrible tragedy, it certainly has made the
voice of the people in Lebanon much louder to the world. Their message was clear;
they wanted Syria to leave, on April 26th• 2005 Syria did leave. Now with Syrian
military and intelligence out of Lebanon, the elections the end of May will certainly
be an historical and integral event in the future of Lebanon. This is most likely where
my next level of research will begin, and finding out the impact of these events on the
Lebanese people.
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Another topic for future study is to look at post Civil War economic growth,
and what obstacles have been placed in the way of developing the thriving economy
that Lebanon once enjoyed. What players have been manipulating Lebanon's
economic future, and how can this country take its place again as the jewel of the
Middle East?

Conclusion
What future is in store for Lebanon? This small Mediterranean country sits at
the crossroads of its future, and Hizb'allah is certainly playing a role in its journey.
This researcher would like to say that all the years of war and turmoil have
enlightened the Lebanese population and they will live happily ever after, but there
are still many issues that plague this incredible country.
Religious and ethnic tolerance is something new to the people of Lebanon,
and it is certainly present in various degrees. Cities such as Beirut have a
cosmopolitan feel, though people generally segregate themselves in schools and
neighborhoods. Their individual prejudices no longer include trips to other villages
to gun people down, but there is a more silent prejudice, which is subdued in order to
function within this very small country. The question still remains about whether the
Lebanese will see this self imposed segregation and work together to make things
better, or continue as they have been for centuries. The war certainly educated
innocent people in the consequences of isolationism, and some things have improved
because of the losses endured during the war, but there are still many things that go
unresolved.
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The Lebanese-Palestinian relationship has not improved through all of this
turmoil. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, there are still
370,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, nearly 12% of Lebanon's population
[Picard, 2002]. In 2000 more than half of the refugees still live in camps that are
surrounded by Lebanese forces, leaving the Palestinians as virtual prisoners [US State
Department Report on Human Rights, 2003]. This is not the way Lebanese treat all
refugees. In 1915 several thousand Armenians arrived after the Turks massacred
many Armenians. Lebanon accepted the Armenians, granting them Lebanese
citizenship and voting rights. Armenians today make up nearly 5% of the Lebanese
population [Gordon, 1983]. In the case of the Palestinians, they are not granted
citizenship, and are not allowed to vote. Their only chance for work is inside the
refugee camps [Haddad, 1985].
With all of the turmoil, death, destruction and fear that has plagued the people
of Lebanon, there is still hope within their hearts. One thing can be certain;
Lebanon's role and future should be constructed by the Lebanese people.
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